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ABSTRACT 
 
Fear of Reporting Bad News: Why Risk and Loss Aversion Can Tempt Top Executives 
to Create Information Asymmetry.  
(August 2009) 
Subrata Chakrabarty, B.E., R. V. College of Engineering, Bangalore University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Asghar Zardkoohi 
 
Top executives sometimes attempt to create information asymmetry through 
corporate reporting manipulation. In the United States, one method was not to report 
financials in certain quarters (this was a legal option before 1970), and a second method 
is to report inaccurate financials (which has been a major concern in the 1990s-2000s). 
This study argues that when cognitive bias of loss aversion is high, a firm’s risk can 
induce such attempts to create information asymmetry. This argument is based on 
prospect theory’s loss aversion axiom, which states that people psychologically weigh 
losses more strongly than equivalent gains.  
In this study, a firm’s risk is theoretically operationalized using independent 
variables of firm-specific risk (firm’s unsystematic risk as assessed by stock market) and 
default risk (difficulty the firm faces in meeting its debt market obligations). 
Correspondingly, loss aversion is theoretically operationalized using moderator variables 
of institutional ownership concentration (as an indicator of shareholder resistance to loss 
aversion) and top executive in-the-money stock options to salary ratio (as an indicator of 
 iv
personal wealth that is exposed to loss if a firm approaches bankruptcy). Hypotheses are 
tested using data collected for a 6 year period from 1964 to 1969 and for a 9 year period 
from 1997 to 2006. 
Findings suggest that when cognitive bias of loss aversion is high, firm-specific 
risk in stock market and default risk in debt market may cause top executives to be 
fearful of reporting bad news, tempting them to create information asymmetry as a 
result. An implication is that the encouragement of risk (as recommended by agency 
theory) without factoring in the role of loss aversion (as highlighted by prospect theory’s 
loss aversion axiom) can be counterproductive. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Capital market stakeholders (that is, shareholders and creditors) require access to 
corporate financial/accounting information to assess a firm’s strategic competitiveness 
(Freeman & McVea, 2001). Despite the importance of such corporate information to 
capital market stakeholders, it is surprising that top executives sometimes attempt to 
create information asymmetry through corporate reporting manipulation (Arthaud Day, 
Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Healy & Palepu, 2001). In other words, by manipulating 
the manner in which corporate information is publicly reported, top executives may try 
to hide factual negative information about the firm, and instead present a depiction that 
is more satisfactory to capital market stakeholders (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Jensen, 
2003). This is a major issue in strategic management research because (i) such corporate 
reporting manipulation essentially misleads capital market stakeholders, and (ii) strategic 
management scholars emphasize strategies for improving firm performance rather than 
creating misleading  perceptions of firm performance  (Arthaud Day et al., 2006; 
O'Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gilley, 2006; Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, & Khanin, 
2008).  
Recent research has made considerable progress, finding that such attempts by 
top executives to create information asymmetry through corporate reporting 
manipulation have been motivated by compensation incentive mechanisms such as stock 
____________ 
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options (Burns & Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, & Swanson, 2007; O'Connor et al., 
2006; Zhang et al., 2008). Nevertheless, a study of US business history reveals a 
theoretical gap, that is, the problem of top executives attempting to create information 
asymmetry through corporate reporting manipulation actually predates the existence of 
stock options. Specifically, stock option trading first started with inception of the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) in 1973 (Fontnouvelle, Fishe, & Harris, 
2003) and stock options started becoming a substantial component of executive 
compensation beginning in the mid 1980s (Hall, 2003: 23). However, the literature 
suggests that even before 1970, many firms chose to create information asymmetry by 
not reporting their financials for certain quarters (Taylor, 1965). This happened in the 
1960s despite the prevalent norm and repeated insistence from major US stock 
exchanges and Security Exchange Commission (SEC) to report financials every quarter 
consistently (Butler, Kraft, & Weiss, 2007; Taylor, 1965). Hence, history suggests that 
top executives have often attempted to create information asymmetry, even in the 
absence of incentive mechanisms such as stock options. Therefore, it seems that in 
addition to the recently observed effects of stock options, certain other fundamental 
antecedents have played a role in motivating top executives to create information 
asymmetry through corporate reporting manipulation.  
The purpose of this study is to extend corporate governance research by further 
exploring the question of why top executives are motivated to engage in the behavior of 
creating information asymmetry through corporate reporting manipulation. The key 
constructs used to address this question in this study are risk (defined as the firm’s 
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actions that ideally aim for large gains but also exposes the firm to a chance of large 
losses) (Eisenmann, 2002; March & Shapira, 1987; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), and 
loss aversion (defined as a “distaste for losses”) (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & 
Schwartz, 1997: 648). This study argues that when loss aversion is high, a firm’s risk 
can tempt top executives to engage in attempts to create information asymmetry. This 
argument is theoretically grounded in prospect theory’s loss aversion axiom, which 
states that people cognitively weigh losses more strongly than equivalent gains (Benartzi 
& Thaler, 1995; Thaler et al., 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). An important 
implication of this argument is that agency theory’s recommendations that encourage 
greater risk without regard for prospect theory’s loss aversion axiom can become 
counterproductive by creating a fear of reporting bad news. To appreciate this argument 
it is important to understand how corporate information may affect those who receive it 
and those who provide it.  
Capital market stakeholders, as receivers of information, prefer frequent and 
accurate information (Eisenhardt, 1989; Freeman & McVea, 2001). In contrast, top 
executives, as providers of information, may not prefer the same. Top executives may 
have concerns about how capital market stakeholders might interpret the information. 
More specifically, capital market stakeholders invest in firms, encourage top executives 
in firms to take risk in order to assure superior returns for their investment, and 
continually seek information on whether a firm’s risk is yielding gains or losses (Aaker 
& Jacobson, 1987; March & Shapira, 1987). Though a firm’s risk comprises its actions 
or context that ideally aim for large gains (to assure returns on investment for capital 
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market stakeholders), it also exposes the firm to a chance of large losses (with likelihood 
that investment obtained from capital market stakeholders can be lost) (Eisenmann, 
2002; March & Shapira, 1987; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Even though risk by 
definition implies that negative outcomes are possible, top executives bear the wrath of 
capital market stakeholders when they disclose any negative information. When capital 
market stakeholders receive information that the firm’s risk is yielding losses rather than 
gains, they become highly dissatisfied and even call for penalizing actions against top 
executives (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).  
Such “strong distaste for losses” is a cognitive bias that is termed loss aversion 
(Thaler et al., 1997: 648), and the corresponding axiom in prospect theory literature is 
that people cognitively weigh losses more strongly than equivalent gains (Benartzi & 
Thaler, 1995; Thaler et al., 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Studies have shown that 
at a subconscious level “losses loom larger than corresponding gains,” and that on 
average, the dissatisfaction from a loss is more than twice the satisfaction from an 
equivalent amount of gain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991: 1039). For example, people on 
average need to be compensated a bit more than $200 to fully overcome a dissatisfaction 
of losing $100 because they “feel the $100 loss more than the $200 gain,” that is, “the 
disutility of losing $100 is roughly twice the utility of gaining $100” (Thaler et al., 1997: 
648-649). This implies that even if disclosed amounts of positive information and 
negative information are technically equal, top executives might be unfairly assessed as 
mediocre because stakeholders give approximately twice the weight to negative 
information and become easily dissatisfied (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Kahneman, 2003). 
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Hence, top executives face a dilemma. On the one hand, capital market stakeholders 
seek information, and on the other hand, disclosure of negative information can create 
more dissatisfaction than it logically should. The cognitive bias of loss aversion tilts the 
balance against disclosure of negative information and in favor of disclosure of either 
positive or no information.  
In sum, though a firm’s risk can yield both positive and negative outcomes, its 
top executives will be concerned that capital market stakeholders might give more 
weight to negative information and become easily dissatisfied. To prevent this 
dissatisfaction, top executives might feel tempted to create information asymmetry 
(Kahneman, 2003). As illustrated in the theoretical framework in Figure 1, this study 
will suggest that the greater the risk, the more likely it is that a firm’s top executives will 
attempt to create information asymmetry. Further, the association between risk and 
attempts to create information asymmetry will be moderated by the extent of loss 
aversion. When loss aversion is high, a firm’s risk will have a strong influence on 
attempts to create information asymmetry. When loss aversion is low, the association 
between firm’s risk and attempts to create information asymmetry will weaken.  
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework 
 
Attempts to create  
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY Firm’s RISK 
Extent of  
LOSS AVERSION 
(+) 
(+) 
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The remaining sections will expand on the theoretical framework in Figure 1 as 
follows. First, theoretical and descriptive background is provided on the two ways in 
which top executives have historically attempted to create information asymmetry: (i) 
attempts to create information asymmetry in the 1960s by not following the consistent 
quarterly reporting norm, and (ii) attempts to create information asymmetry in the 
1990s-2000s through inaccurate reporting. Second, in the theory development and 
hypotheses section, a firm’s risk is theoretically operationalized in accordance with 
capital market stakeholder perspectives as: (i) firm-specific risk (firm’s unsystematic 
risk as assessed by stock market), and (ii) default risk (difficulty faced by firm in 
meeting its debt market obligations). Hypotheses suggest that both these types of risk 
influence attempts to create information asymmetry in both eras (inconsistent reporting 
in the 1960s and inaccurate reporting in the 1990s-2000s). Furthermore, hypotheses 
suggest that the extent of loss aversion moderates the influence of risk. The moderator 
variables (indicative of loss aversion) are institutional ownership concentration (as an 
indicator of shareholder resistance to loss aversion) and top executive in-the-money 
stock options to salary ratio (as an indicator of personal wealth that is exposed to loss if 
firm approaches bankruptcy). Third, the methods section elaborates on the sample, 
procedure, and measures.  
Finally, the discussion section elaborates on the implication of this study, that is, 
it provides an alternative theoretical explanation for why top executives create 
information asymmetry. Traditionally, agency theory literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen, 1986, 2000; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) has suggested that (i) executives 
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opportunistically create information asymmetry because of their own self-interest, (ii) 
stock market investors should demand greater firm-specific risk for greater returns, and 
(iii) higher debt ensures greater managerial efficiency. While agency theory explanations 
are well established, this study highlights the paradox that such demands for greater 
firm-specific risk and higher debt might turn counterproductive by creating a fear of 
reporting negative news. A firm’s risk constitutes both firm-specific risk in the stock 
market and default risk in the debt market. Risk, by definition, implies that both positive 
and negative outcomes are possible. However, because of the cognitive bias of loss 
aversion, negative information related to the firm’s risk may be given much more weight 
than equivalent positive information. Hence, top executives fear reporting negative 
information because they worry that the capital market stakeholders will give more 
weight to negative information and become dissatisfied. Hence, in contrast to agency 
theory explanations noted above, this study suggests that (i) attempts to create 
information asymmetry can be a result of fear of reporting bad news to capital market 
stakeholders, (ii) when loss aversion is high, firm-specific risk in stock market can turn 
counterproductive by creating a fear of reporting bad news, and (iii) when loss aversion 
is high, default risk in debt market can turn counterproductive by creating a fear of 
reporting bad news.  
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND: INFORMATION ASYMMETRY THROUGH CORPORATE 
REPORTING MANIPULATION 
 
One of the well established “organizational assumptions” in corporate 
governance literature is that of “information asymmetry” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59). In this 
study, the term information asymmetry means that top executives have private 
information that is not made available to capital market stakeholders (Dalton, Hitt, 
Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kochhar & Hitt, 
1998). Information asymmetry is a manifestation of top executives having an “incentive 
to lie or hide information” (Jensen, 2003: 393). Corporate reporting manipulation is an 
attempt to purposefully create information asymmetry through acts of either concealing 
or falsifying factual corporate level financial/accounting data (Arthaud Day et al., 2006; 
Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Jensen, 2003). This may mislead 
others into perceiving the firm’s performance in a more positive light than it actually is 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Jensen, 2003). There are two 
opportunistic aspects associated with information asymmetry, namely, “adverse 
selection (i.e., hidden information) and moral hazard (i.e., hidden actions)” (Sanders & 
Boivie, 2004: 167). Correspondingly, top executives have attempted to create 
information asymmetry through corporate reporting manipulation in the following two 
ways. (1) Inconsistent reporting: Top executives may choose (if legally possible) to 
completely avoid reporting financials in certain periods, because such complete hiding 
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of information gives them flexibility to average out privately known negative 
information with positive information over an extended interval and helps prevent 
potential panic/distress in the stock market. (2) Inaccurate reporting: Top executives 
may report inaccurate financials to the public, after privately carrying out hidden actions 
of unethically manipulating the numbers. The following sections describe the historical 
and theoretical background of both these types of corporate reporting manipulation.    
Inconsistency in Following Quarterly Reporting Norm: The 1960s 
In the 1960s, some US firms avoided reporting their financials for certain 
quarters of their choice, even though quarterly reporting had become a legitimate and 
widely established norm by the 1960s (Butler et al., 2007). To stop such deviations from 
the norm, quarterly reporting norm was converted into a legally binding requirement in 
1970. The following sections describe the resistance by firms against quarterly reporting, 
the lobby that favored consistent quarterly reporting, the inconsistency in following 
quarterly reporting norm by some firms in 1960s, and the theoretical arguments on the 
utility of choice to withhold reports.  
The resistance against quarterly reporting. As illustrated in Figure 2, quarterly 
reporting was made mandatory in 1970, but the debate on the need for quarterly 
reporting started long before. There was considerable resistance against mandatory 
quarterly reporting, and the SEC’s initial 1946 proposal requiring limited quarterly sales 
reporting had to be revoked in 1953 because of this resistance (Taylor, 1965). A 
compelling reason for this resistance was that quarterly reporting fails to account for the 
seasonal and/or fluctuating nature of income and can therefore provide an unreliable and 
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misleading picture1 (Fields et al., 2001; Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981; Taylor, 
1963). For example, in a complaint to the SEC, a firm named ‘A. C. Gilbert Co.’ argued 
that “our business is highly seasonal, since we manufacture trains and toys for Christmas 
business” and that disclosing “results reflecting the first half-year’s operations would 
tend to disturb stockholders, distributors, brokers, and lending institutions” (Taylor, 
1963: 133). Another firm ‘Iron Fireman Manufacturing Co.’ complained to the SEC that 
“violent variations in profits that resulted from the seasonal factor” can make interim 
quarterly reports misleading (Taylor, 1963:138). Because of such concerns, researchers 
such as Gilman (1939: 77) suggested that “seasonal characteristics rule out any 
accounting period shorter than a year” and a firm’s internal quarterly reports “are seldom 
considered sufficiently reliable” for assessing a firm’s overall strategic competitiveness. 
Further, fluctuations can happen even in non-seasonal and diversified businesses. For 
example, Ampco Metal Inc. argued: “Our operations and widely diversified products 
repeatedly show extreme volume shifts. We have had years when our entire profit for the 
year was earned in one quarter. This does not occur in any seasonal pattern” (Taylor, 
1963: 132). Hence, a major reason behind the resistance against mandatory quarterly 
reporting was that it would provide an unreliable and misleading picture because of the 
fluctuating nature of income during a year.   
                                                 
1 Another reason sometimes offered is the additional costs in preparing quarterly financial reports. 
However, this reason was considered relatively unimportant because “the marginal out-of-pocket costs of 
external reporting are low for many listed firms because they have some form of internal interim 
reporting” (Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981: 60). 
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1,2 Sources: www.nyse.com, Taylor 1963/1965, Butler et al. 2007, Karpoff et al. 2008, www.gao.gov, www.sec.gov  
1 Reporting financials every quarter had become a widely prevalent norm by the 1960s. Despite this, some 
listed firms in the 1960s chose to not follow the norm of consistent quarterly reporting. This was finally 
made illegal by SEC in 1970. 
2 Quarterly reporting has been mandatory since 1970. Inaccurate reporting has been increasingly visible in 
1990s-2000s. 
Figure 2. History of information asymmetry through corporate reporting manipulation 
                                       2002-2005 
Cumulatively, almost 16% of listed 
firms announced intent to restate 
inaccurate reports during 2002-2005
    |            |           |           |            |            |            |            |           |             |            |            |            | 
1890    1900    1910    1920     1930     1940     1950     1960    1970     1980     1990     2000     2010 
1934 
SEC made annual reporting mandatory  
1970
  SEC made quarterly reporting mandatory
1895 
NYSE 
recommended 
annual reporting 
                 1920s-1960s 
Stock analysts and NYSE led the way in 
increasingly lobbying for greater disclosure 
through quarterly reporting  
1934 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
with task of ensuring disclosure by firms. 
2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
goes into effect, making 
it harder to hide 
inaccuracy in reporting.
                                                             1946 
SEC tried to make quarterly reporting of sales mandatory 
                               1953 
Facing resistance from firms, SEC withdrew 
attempts to mandate quarterly reporting of sales.
5% in 1962
1960s
Quarterly reporting became a widely prevalent 
institutional norm, adopted by 95% NYSE firms. 
However, 5-10% firms used legal right to not 
report quarterly as per their choice. 
Choosing to Not Report Quarterly (Before 1970)1
Timeline 
37% in1931
75% in 1926 
Approximate annual % of listed 
firms (on NYSE, AMEX, & Nasdaq)
that announced intent to restate 
inaccurate reports 
7% 
in 2005 
3.7% in 2002 
                        1997-2002 
Cumulatively, almost 8% of listed 
firms announced intent to restate 
inaccurate reports during this period. 
Highlights:  
• 1998: Cendant inflated revenue by 
$500 million over three years. 
• 2000: MicroStrategy inflated 
income by $56 million over three 
years. 
• 2001: Enron inflated income by 
$591 million over four years. 
• 2002: WorldCom inflated income 
by $9 billion over three years. 
   Inaccurate Reporting (After 1970)2
Approximate annual % of listed firms that 
were not reporting quarterly:  
10.5% in 1955 
NYSE 
AMEX
50%  
in1959 39%  
    in1962
0.7% in 1997
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The lobby for quarterly reporting. On the other side of the debate was a growing 
lobby that favored mandatory quarterly reporting. The argument advanced by those 
taking this position was that stock analysts have a valid need for continual information 
about a firm’s strategic competitiveness (Fields et al., 2001; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 
1999; Taylor, 1965). For example, one stock analyst wrote to the SEC complaining that 
“during the intervals between annual reports, a great deal can happen which will affect 
the value of a security both by itself and in relation to other issues” (Taylor, 1965: 93). 
The stock analyst suggested to the SEC that quarterly reports will “put the investor on 
notice of such trends or developments and make it possible to take prompt action when 
such is called for” (Taylor, 1965: 93).  
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of financial reporting regulation in the United 
States. Since the 1920s, both stock analysts and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
were at the forefront of lobbying for consistent quarterly reporting, and continually 
pressured firms to report quarterly (Butler et al., 2007; Taylor, 1965). When the SEC 
was established in 1934, the purpose was to ensure greater information disclosure by 
firms. The SEC made annual reporting mandatory in 1934, and thereafter worked toward 
encouraging quarterly reporting. Quarterly reporting was often grudgingly adopted by 
top executives; for example, one executive complained that the NYSE “has put undue 
pressure on us and starting in August 1964 we are planning to issue quarterly reports 
even though it is against our better judgment” (Taylor, 1965: 91). In response to 
continual pressure, the annual percentage of NYSE firms that were not reporting 
quarterly showed a gradual decline. As illustrated in Figure 2, the decline was from 
 13
around 75% in 1926, to 37% in 1931, to 10.5% in 1955, to 6.5% in 1959, and to 5% in 
1962  (Butler et al., 2007; Taylor, 1963; Taylor, 1965). While the SEC and NYSE were 
at the forefront of demanding quarterly reporting, smaller exchanges such as the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) found it tougher to demand quarterly reporting 
because of strong opposition from its listed firms (Taylor, 1963). Nevertheless, because 
of intense lobbying by stock analysts and the SEC, quarterly reporting was increasingly 
becoming a norm in the United States, and the percentage of AMEX firms not adopting 
quarterly reporting showed a rapid decline from around 50% in 1959 to 39% in 1962 
(Taylor, 1963: 195). Recognizing this trend, AMEX amended its stance in 1962 to 
largely mimic that of the NYSE, by requiring quarterly reporting from newly listed firms 
and urging established firms to consider adopting quarterly reporting (Taylor, 1963). In 
sum, under continual pressure from stock analysts, the SEC, and stock exchanges, 
quarterly reporting became a widely prevalent institutional norm by the 1960s.  
Inconsistency in following quarterly reporting norm during the 1960s. Though 
quarterly reporting had become an institutional norm by the early 1960s, some listed 
firms (around 5-10% firms on the NYSE and around 20-30% firms on the AMEX) 
continued to resist the norm and strategically chose to not report quarterly, or at least not 
do so on a consistent basis. These few firms made use of their legal right to hide 
information (by not following the consistent quarterly reporting norm) because there was 
no mandatory regulation/law against this practice (Butler et al., 2007; Taylor, 1965). 
Despite the legality of these actions in the 1960s, the actions were not necessarily 
legitimate in terms of the prevailing norm of consistent quarterly reporting, because 
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legitimacy requires that actions follow the socially constructed system of norms 
(Suchman, 1995: 574). This discrepancy caused considerable angst among those who 
favored consistent quarterly reporting by all firms. For example, the Chairman of the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) in a letter in 1962 noted that “rightly or wrongly 
over the years” quarterly reporting has “tended to become a commonly accepted 
practice” and that he was “continually receiving complaints from stockholders of listed 
companies concerning the lack of interim earnings reports” (Taylor, 1965: 90). Finally, 
the SEC publicized and proposed the need for mandatory quarterly reporting on a new 
10-Q form in September 1969, adopted the proposal for mandatory quarterly reporting in 
October 1970, and the institutional regulation came into force starting December 1970 
(Butler et al., 2007). The enforcement of this 1970 SEC institutional regulation 
mandating consistent quarterly reporting ended the legal choice that US firms had for 
withholding information by not reporting quarterly results on a consistent basis.  
Theoretical arguments on utility of choice to withhold reports. While the 
prerogative to choose non-disclosure (by not reporting consistently in quarterly 
intervals) was made illegal for US firms in 1970, it continues to be a legally allowed 
alternative in some other countries and some scholars continue to advocate the need for 
such an alternative (Alford, Jones, Leftwich, & Zmijewski, 1993; Bhojraj & Libby, 
2005). A legal alternative for non-disclosure would provide  top executives with 
flexibility to (i) prevent potential panic/distress selling of stock during chosen periods 
when they are privately aware of negative information and (ii) hope that future gains will 
average out current losses in the next financial report, thereby giving capital market 
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stakeholders a more satisfying impression of its strategic competitiveness (Easley, 
Kiefer, O'Hara, & Paperman, 1996; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000).  
By lengthening the gap between reporting events, top executives can average out 
the negative information with positive information during the extended interval (Thaler 
et al., 1997). As noted, when a firm’s corporate information is shared with the capital 
market frequently, capital market stakeholders will weigh more heavily the negative 
signals rather than the positive signals and thus are more likely to perceive that the firm 
is in trouble (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Kahneman, 2003). To counter this, top executives 
can create a favorable (and accurate) impression in the capital market by simply 
lengthening the gap between reporting events and thereby average out the negative 
information with positive information during chosen periods (Thaler et al., 1997). As a 
hypothetical example, suppose that a firm’s activities yield a gain of $150 in one quarter 
and a loss of $100 in another quarter. Then, following prospect theory’s loss aversion 
axiom on the differential weighting of gains and losses, capital market stakeholders will 
psychologically feel a dissatisfaction of net loss of $50 over the two quarters: [$150 – 
2*($100) = –$50]. However if the firm reports over an extended interval of two quarters 
(rather than every one quarter) then its actual net gains shown to capital market 
stakeholders would be [$150 – $100 = +$50] and shareholders would be satisfied 
because they do not see the losses. The averaging of negative information with positive 
information over an extended period of time mitigates the problem of psychological loss 
aversion (Thaler et al., 1997). 
 16
Further, Welker (1995: 803) suggests that when a firm opts for such “non-
announcement periods” it can prevent panic/distress selling of stock. When “firm-
specific information may exist but has not been publicly disclosed by the firm,” stock 
market traders are hesitant to buy and sell stocks of the firm (Welker, 1995: 803). 
Welker (1995: 803) suggests that this hesitancy arises because stock market traders want 
to avoid “adverse selection” while buying/selling stocks. That is, the absence of 
information about strategic competitiveness of a firm makes it harder to judge the value 
of the firm’s stock (Chi, 1994; Kochhar & Hitt, 1998), and less informed stock market 
traders will protect themselves against potential losses from trading with possibly better 
informed stock market traders (Welker, 1995). Taking advantage of this knowledge that 
stock market traders will be unwilling to trade in the absence of information, a firm’s top 
executives might choose to avoid reporting financials whenever they are privately aware 
of some negative information. This prevents any potential panic/distress selling of stock, 
and gives top executives the time needed to average out the negative information with 
positive information before reporting the information.  
In sum, the literature suggests that top executives might prefer a flexible legal 
option that allows them to withhold reporting of their quarterly financials, especially 
when they have private information that they do not want to announce publicly at that 
particular point of time (Alford et al., 1993; Bhojraj & Libby, 2005). 
Inaccurate Reporting: The 1990s-2000s 
As noted, the legal option to create information asymmetry by not following the 
consistent quarterly reporting norm ended in 1970, meaning that top executives who 
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feared reporting negative news could no longer use this legal option. Since then, some 
top executives have been increasingly tempted to take an unethical and illegal action that 
creates information asymmetry. That is “the temptation to make the numbers by fudging 
the accounts” (Heineman, 2007: 100) and thereby report inaccurate financials (Arthaud 
Day et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2008). The following sections describe the historical and 
theoretical backgrounds of inaccurate reporting in the 1990s-2000s.  
Inaccurate reporting in 1990s-2000s. A restatement announcement is a public 
acknowledgment that corporate reporting has been inaccurate and that the firm intends to 
restate its inaccurate reports as a correction (Arthaud Day et al., 2006). The firm makes 
such announcements when the hidden action of inaccurate reporting is caught and 
revealed by some entity (such as auditors, someone in the firm, the SEC, or certain 
undisclosed parties) (USGAO, 2002: 23). The literature suggests that restatement 
announcements (announcing the need to correct inaccurate reports) were hardly visible 
before the 1990s (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008). 
Before 1970, firms had a legal choice to avoid reporting their quarterly financials, and 
therefore they had no utility for the unethical and illegal choice of inaccurate reporting. 
In the first few decades after 1970 (that is, 1970s-1980s), there were a very low number 
of public restatement announcements, probably because weaker institutional regulations 
prevented the detection of inaccurate reporting (Dechow et al., 1996; Karpoff et al., 
2008). With gradual strengthening of institutional regulations, incidences of restatements 
increasingly came to light in the 1990s-2000s (Dechow et al., 1996; Karpoff et al., 
2008). A prominent example was WorldCom, which had inaccurately booked some of 
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its expenses as investments in assets, leading to higher but inaccurately stated profits 
(Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006).  
The U. S. Government undertook a major initiative to identify restatement 
announcement events during the period 1997 to 2006 (USGAO, 2003, 2007). 
Restatements identified by GAO are a result of major accounting problems and not a 
result of minor changes or errors in accounting procedures (Arthaud Day et al., 2006; 
Zhang et al., 2008). The GAO “focused on financial restatements resulting from 
accounting irregularities, including so-called ‘aggressive’ accounting practices, 
intentional and unintentional misuse of facts applied to financial statements, oversight or 
misinterpretation of accounting rules, and fraud” (USGAO, 2003: 4). The GAO then 
excluded any restatements that were routine and not a result of accounting irregularities. 
For example, they “excluded restatements resulting from mergers and acquisitions, 
discontinued operations, stock splits, issuance of stock dividends, currency-related 
issues, changes in business segment definitions, changes due to transfers of 
management, changes made for presentation purposes, general accounting changes under 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), litigation settlements, and arithmetic 
and general bookkeeping errors” (USGAO, 2003: 5). Hence, the restatements identified 
by the GAO and used in this study represent attempts to create information asymmetry 
through inaccurate reporting.  
As illustrated in Figure 2, the approximate annual percentage of listed firms (on 
the NYSE, the AMEX, and the Nasdaq stock exchanges) that restated because of 
inaccurate reporting increased from 0.7% in 1997, to 3.7% in 2002, and to 7% in 2005 
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(USGAO, 2002, 2007). Of these, the restatement announcements by Enron in 2001 
(which had inflated income by $591 million over a four-year period) and WorldCom in 
2002 (which had inflated income by $9 billion over a three-year period) received wide 
publicity and condemnation. In response to such corporate scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was enacted in July 2002, which made it harder for firms to hide information 
through inaccurate reporting, and led to more cases of inaccurate reporting being 
revealed. Cumulatively, more than 20% of listed firms have announced an intention to 
restate inaccurate reports at some point of time during the 1997-2005 period (with 8% of 
listed firms announcing restatements sometime during the 1997-2001 period before 
Sarbanes-Oxley, and 16% of listed firms announcing restatements sometime during the 
2002-2005 period) (USGAO, 2007). 
Theoretical literature on inaccurate reporting. The various inaccurate reporting 
scandals in 1990s-2000s mean that top executives are often tempted to create a more 
favorable impression with capital market stakeholders by releasing inaccurate statements 
(Moore et al., 2006). The market and the public learns about this when the firm 
acknowledges that its financial reports have been inaccurate, and that it intends to restate 
the financial reports as a correction (Arthaud Day et al., 2006; O'Connor et al., 2006; 
Zhang et al., 2008). The strategic management literature notes that “restatements tend to 
involve intentional actions taken by firm leaders”, “constitute a more direct breach of 
stakeholder trust,” and hurts organizational legitimacy (Arthaud Day et al., 2006: 1121). 
The action to “generate an inflated earnings report” is a “hidden action” (Crocker & 
Slemrod, 2007: 698), and the literature refers to such hidden actions as a ‘moral hazard’ 
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(Kochhar & Hitt, 1998; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). Moral hazard implies “non-
compliance” or shirking of contractually required actions (Durand & Vargas, 2003: 668) 
and the “evasion of a broadly specified obligation” that executives had otherwise 
promised to oblige in good faith (Chi, 1994: 277-279). Prospect theory suggests that 
such reluctance to show negative information might be because of the cognitive bias of 
loss aversion (Kahneman, 2003; Thaler et al., 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). To counter loss aversion, top executives might be 
tempted to create a more favorable impression by releasing inaccurate statements that 
show higher gains and possibly lower losses (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005; 
Moore et al., 2006).  
In the next section, theories on risk and loss aversion are used to explain why top 
executives attempt to create information asymmetry through these two forms of 
corporate reporting manipulation (inconsistent reporting in the 1960s and inaccurate 
reporting in the 1990s-2000s). 
 21
CHAPTER III 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
As illustrated earlier in the general theoretical framework (Figure 1), this study 
suggests that risk influences attempts to create information asymmetry. The connotation 
of the term risk varies across disciplines, and top executives who actually practice 
strategic management have their own connotation (March & Shapira, 1987). The 
common person defines risk as “exposure to possible loss, injury, or danger,” 
psychologists define risk in terms of “perceptions of people exposed to potential loss,” 
economists define risk as variability in returns, technology scientists define risk as “the 
probability of event times the impact of the event,” and sociologists define risk in terms 
of “hazards and insecurities” in society (Shrivastava, 1995: 119-120). The literature 
suggests that top executives take a firm-level perspective and view a “risky” action or 
context as one “with a wide range of possible outcomes” and which “contains a threat of 
a very poor outcome” for the firm (March & Shapira, 1987: 1407). Even though a firm’s 
risk taking ideally aims for large gains, they also expose the firm to a chance of large 
losses, whereby the investment obtained from capital market stakeholders can be lost 
(Eisenmann, 2002; March & Shapira, 1987; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Studies show 
that top executives seem to be primarily concerned about negative outcomes rather than 
positive outcomes associated with risk (March & Shapira, 1987: 1407). Accordingly, in 
the strategic management literature,  a firm’s risk from the perspective of its top 
executives is usually defined as the firm’s “exposure to a chance of a salient loss” 
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(Eisenmann, 2002: 514) or “the likelihood that most or all of an investment will be lost” 
(Sanders & Hambrick, 2007: 1059).  
Further, risk plays an important role in a variety of strategic management 
research streams (Bromiley, Miller, & Rau, 2001; March & Shapira, 1987). For 
example, risk has been found to be an important variable in product diversification and 
international diversification (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1994), vertical integration 
(D'Aveni & Ilinitch, 1992), corporate governance and compensation (Eisenmann, 2002; 
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), corporate social 
responsibility (Bansal & Clelland, 2004), and general firm performance (Aaker & 
Jacobson, 1987; Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990). As noted in the theoretical framework in 
Figure 1, this study limits its focus to the influence of risk on attempts to create 
information asymmetry.  
Previous research has theoretically and empirically operationalized firm’s risk in 
a variety of ways because of the wide variety of theoretical perspectives used in strategic 
management (Bromiley et al., 2001; Helfat & Teece, 1987). The accepted practice is that 
“the choice of risk measure should reflect the relevant stakeholder perspective for testing 
any particular theory” (Bromiley et al., 2001: 266). Because this study investigates 
information asymmetry between top executives and capital market stakeholders, and 
because capital market stakeholders include both stock market and debt market 
stakeholders, this study will theoretically operationalize risk using: (1) firm-specific risk 
(firm’s unsystematic risk as assessed by stock market), and (2) default risk (difficulty 
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faced by firm in meeting its debt market obligations)2 (Alchian & Woodward, 1991; 
Bromiley et al., 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Further, because firm-specific risk will 
be measured using stock market data and default risk will be measured using accounting 
data, this satisfies the recommendation in the literature that both stock market and 
accounting measures of risk be used for greater validity (Bromiley et al., 2001).  The 
next few sections address the influence of firm-specific risk in the stock market, while 
later sections address the influence of default risk in the debt market.  
Influence of Firm-Specific Risk on Attempts to Create Information Asymmetry 
Stock market investors often desire that top executives take greater firm-specific 
risk for higher returns (Hambrick et al., 2005; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Firm-specific risk (also known as business risk or unsystematic 
risk) is the stock market’s assessment of the risk involved with a firm’s actions and 
context, and this risk is reflected as the portion of variability in stock returns attributable 
to the firm’s actions and context (Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990; Bansal & Clelland, 2004). 
Strategic management scholars have highlighted the need to understand the 
consequences of firm-specific risk (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987; Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990; 
Bettis, 1983; Hambrick et al., 2005; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Wiseman & Gomez-
                                                 
2 While firm-specific risk and default risk are defined and measured differently (using respective stock 
market and debt market parameters), they are somewhat interrelated forms of a firm’s risk because of the 
“tension between creditors and stockholders” whereby firm-specific risk may affect creditors and default 
risk (or bankruptcy risk) may affect stockholders (Alchian & Woodward, 1991: 141). For example, 
stockholders have incentive to encourage greater firm-specific risk, because the creditors bear part of the 
downside cost on any losses, but stockholders get all of the upside gains. Further, when firm-specific risk 
is higher, creditors find it harder to assess the value of firm’s assets because of the associated volatility in 
stock prices, and therefore find it harder to make credit-lending decisions. Likewise, firms close to 
bankruptcy usually witness drop in stock prices, and common stockholders of bankrupt firms get the last 
priority upon sale of assets (whereas creditors get the first priority). Hence, top executives have to be 
equally concerned about managing both firm-specific risk in stock market and default risk in debt market 
to keep capital market stakeholders satisfied as a whole (Alchian & Woodward, 1991). 
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Mejia, 1998). Because firm-specific risk reflects the variation in a stock’s return due to 
firm-specific actions and context, it plays an important role in strategy evaluation as the 
stock market’s assessment of a firm’s risk (Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990). Stock market 
investors monitor a firm’s risk taking activities by studying financial statements or 
follow recommendations of stock analysts who do the same (Lintner, 1965). If firm-
specific risk assessed by the stock market is low, it implies that the firm’s actions are 
expected to yield steady and ordinary revenue streams (that is, gains/losses are expected 
to be small in variation). In contrast, if firm-specific risk assessed by the stock market is 
high, the firm’s actions are expected to yield either large gains (if the risk taken is 
successful) or large losses (if the risk taken is unsuccessful).  
Prospect theory research suggests that the human cognitive bias of loss aversion 
holds true for stock market investors too; that is, stock market investors hate to lose 
more than they love to win (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Haigh & List, 2005; Kahneman, 
2003). The extent to which stock market investors blame executives when firm-specific 
risk yields losses is usually much greater than the extent to which stock market investors 
praise executives when firm-specific risk yields equivalent gains. Because of such 
unbalanced reactions by loss-averse stock market investors, top executives fear that they 
will have to bear a disproportionate amount of blame and be portrayed as mediocre or 
below average leaders if they report bad news (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987; Amihud & 
Lev, 1981; Hambrick et al., 2005).  
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However, top executives attach great value to their personal reputation, and want 
to avoid being portrayed as mediocre or below average leaders (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Fanelli & Misangyi, 2006). Because top executives are constantly under pressures that 
“demand both risk taking and assured success,” they believe that they need to somehow 
“change the odds” (March & Shapira, 1987: 1414). The organizational decline literature 
suggests when top executives fall short of expectations, they often enter a state of denial 
by behaving as if the “problem does not exist or that it is not serious” and provide false 
encouragement by “hiding bad news from creditors and stockholders” to soothe their 
own fear of reprisal (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988: 16). Further, impression management 
theory suggests that top executives attempt to manage the impression they give by 
‘putting their best foot forward’ by hiding negative news and providing only optimistic 
and pleasant news (Davidson, Jiraporn, Young Sang, & Nemec, 2004; Fanelli & 
Misangyi, 2006; Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Accordingly, top executives might be 
tempted to hide information (that is, suppress the disclosure of negative signals 
emanating from firm-specific risk taking), so that the psychological dissatisfaction from 
loss aversion can be avoided (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Kahneman, 2003).   
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Overall, the above theoretical arguments suggest that the greater the firm-specific 
risk, the greater the likelihood of attempts to create information asymmetry through 
corporate reporting manipulation. As discussed earlier, attempts to create information 
asymmetry through corporate reporting manipulation have happened in two ways: 
inconsistent reporting in the 1960s, and (ii) inaccurate reporting in the 1990s-2000s. 
First, even though quarterly reporting had become a legitimate and widely established 
norm in the 1960s, some US firms did not follow this norm consistently. Second, there 
have been a large number of announcements on the need to restate inaccurate reports in 
the 1990s-2000s. Based on the theoretical reasons discussed above, it can be concluded 
that firm-specific risk influenced attempts to create information asymmetry in both these 
eras (this is illustrated in Figure 3).  
Hypothesis 1a. Firm-specific risk has a positive influence on attempts to create 
information asymmetry through inconsistent reporting (in the 1960s). 
Hypothesis 1b. Firm-specific risk has a positive influence attempts to create 
information asymmetry through inaccurate reporting (in the 1990s-2000s). 
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Figure 3. Models and hypotheses 
 
Firm-Specific Risk 
in stock market 
Information Asymmetry  
through  
Inconsistent Reporting  
 
(inconsistent in following 
quarterly reporting norm in 1960s)
Attempts to Create Information Asymmetry in 1960s:  
Firms sometimes choose to extend the time-gap between financial reports, that is, they do 
not follow the consistent  quarterly reporting norm.  
Attempts to Create Information Asymmetry in 1990s-2000s:  
Firms sometimes report inaccurate financial statements, which need to be eventually 
restated as a correction.  
H1a (+)  
Firm’s Default Risk 
in debt market 
H2a (–)  
H3a (+)  
Firm-Specific Risk 
in stock market H1b (+)  
Firm’s Default Risk 
in debt market 
H2b (–)  
H3b (+)  
Top Executive In-the-money Stock 
Options to Salary Ratio 
 
( indicating personal wealth that is exposed 
to loss in firms approaching bankruptcy ) 
H4 (+)  
Institutional Ownership 
Concentration 
 
( indicating resistance to loss 
aversion ) 
Information Asymmetry  
through  
Inaccurate Reporting  
 
(inaccurate reports requiring 
restatements in 1990s-2000s) 
Institutional Ownership 
Concentration 
 
( indicating resistance to loss 
aversion ) 
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Interactive Effect of Firm-Specific Risk and Loss Aversion  
The previous section suggested that firm-specific risk influences attempts to 
create information asymmetry. The argument was that top executives fear reporting bad 
news because they worry about the cognitive bias of loss aversion among shareholders. 
However, the extent of loss aversion among shareholders can vary (Benartzi & Thaler, 
1995; Haigh & List, 2005; List, 2003). That is, the strength of the association between 
firm-specific risk and attempts to create information asymmetry might be contingent 
upon the extent to which the firm’s shareholders are loss averse. The concept of ‘myopic 
loss aversion’ can help explain this contingency.   
The commonly held view about stock market traders is that they are myopically 
loss averse (Haigh & List, 2005; Laverty, 1996). Myopic loss aversion is defined as the 
“combination of short horizons and strong distaste for losses” (Thaler et al., 1997: 648). 
Here, myopia refers to the relative tendency to “make short-term choices rather than 
adopt long-term policies” (Thaler et al., 1997: 648), and prospect theory’s ‘loss aversion’ 
axiom suggests that people cognitively weigh losses more strongly than equivalent gains 
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Kahneman, 2003; Thaler et al., 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Such myopic loss aversion or ‘short-termism’ is 
usually noticed when ownership is diffused, that is, a large number of shareholders own 
small stakes (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Laverty, 1996). 
Shareholders with small stakes exhibit myopic loss aversion tendencies because they 
“have neither the interest nor the knowledge to wait for the long run” and therefore tend 
to buy/sell stocks based on short term indicators  (Laverty, 1996: 833).  
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In contrast, there is resistance against myopic loss aversion tendencies when 
ownership is largely concentrated in a few committed and knowledgeable shareholders, 
such as institutional investors (Baysinger et al., 1991; David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001; 
Hansen & Hill, 1991). Institutional ownership concentration is defined as the extent to 
which a large amount of a firm’s shares are owned by few institutional owners 
(Baysinger et al., 1991). Higher institutional ownership concentration can be an indicator 
of shareholder resistance to myopic loss aversion tendencies. First, because institutional 
investors usually hold diversified portfolios of stocks, they are less affected by short-
term losses from firm-specific risk of a particular stock and instead aim for long-term 
gains from the stock (Baysinger et al., 1991: 212). Second, institutional investors 
holding large stakes of a firm’s stock find it harder to move in and out of stock positions, 
and therefore develop a long-term commitment to the firm (Baysinger et al., 1991: 213). 
Freeman and Evan (1990: 342) explain that “while the assets of stockholders who hold a 
small percentage of the shares of stock are re-deployable in an almost costless manner, 
this is not true for stockholders who hold large blocks of shares.” This is because “the 
market for shares would discount the value of these shares if they were all offered for 
sale at one time” and therefore, “large shareholders incur asset specificity” that promotes 
their long-term commitment and reduces their myopic loss aversion (Freeman & Evan, 
1990: 342).  
Third, because institutional investors are highly specialized investors who invest 
on behalf of others, they need to be accountable for any significant position taken in a 
firm. As a result, institutional investors employ highly experienced and trained 
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professionals to carry out extensive analysis on the inherent quality and value of firms 
that they invest in (List, 2003; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). This reduces governance 
uncertainty and boosts their confidence to make a long-term commitment to the firm 
(List, 2003; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). For example, David et al (2001: 153) note that 
dominant institutional investors with large ownership stakes “exercise influence through 
activism that successfully pressures firms to make appropriate long-term investments.” 
Further, a content analysis by Abrahamson and Park (1994: 1327) of letters sent by firms 
to shareholders found that firms with dominant institutional investors were less fearful of 
reporting negative news. The reduced fear of reporting negative news was because the 
dominant institutional investors actively encouraged long-term strategies instead of 
worrying about short-term losses. In contrast, letters from firms with diffused and/or 
non-institutional shareholders (that is, the gamut of diffused non-institutional 
shareholders, diffused institutional shareholders, and dominant non-institutional 
shareholders) indicated a greater fear of  reporting negative news, because such 
shareholders were more concerned about short-term losses (Abrahamson & Park, 1994: 
1327).  
Hence, institutional ownership concentration is an indicator of resistance to loss 
aversion. As illustrated in Figure 3, institutional ownership concentration moderates the 
influence of firm-specific risk on attempts to create information asymmetry in both the 
1960s and 1990s-2000s. When institutional ownership concentration is low (that is, loss 
aversion is high), firm-specific risk is more likely to tempt top executives to create 
information asymmetry. When institutional ownership concentration is high (that is, loss 
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aversion is low), firm-specific risk is less likely to tempt top executives to create 
information asymmetry.  
Hypothesis 2a. The extent of institutional ownership concentration (as an 
indicator of resistance to loss aversion) moderates the association between firm-
specific risk and inconsistent reporting in the 1960s, such that the association is 
more positive when institutional ownership concentration is lower than when it is 
higher.   
Hypothesis 2b. The extent of institutional ownership concentration (as an 
indicator of resistance to loss aversion) moderates the association between firm-
specific risk and inaccurate reporting in the 1990-2000s, such that the 
association is more positive when institutional ownership concentration is lower 
than when it is higher. 
 
The four hypotheses suggested above focus on the influence of firm-specific risk 
on attempts to create information asymmetry. Our focus now shifts to the influence of an 
alternative form of risk, that is, the influence of default risk in debt market on attempts to 
create information asymmetry. Incorporating both these forms of risk satisfies 
recommendations in strategic management literature that scholars should (i) use both 
stock market and accounting measures of risk for greater validity, and (ii) use constructs 
that reflect relevant stakeholder perspectives – that is, both stock market and debt market 
stakeholders from whom top executives might attempt to conceal information (Bromiley 
et al., 2001).  
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Influence of Default Risk on Attempts to Create Information Asymmetry 
Though both firm-specific risk in the stock market and default risk in the debt 
market are manifestations of a firm’s risk, they are not identical (D'Aveni & Ilinitch, 
1992; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Miller & Reuer, 1996). In contrast to firm-specific risk 
(which is reflected as volatility in stock price due to firm specific factors), a firm’s 
default risk is defined as the extent to which a firm finds it difficult to meet its current 
debt obligations of paying back interest and/or principal owed to creditors (Altman & 
Saunders, 1997; D'Aveni & Ilinitch, 1992; Miller & Reuer, 1996). This risk of defaulting 
on debt payments is also called bankruptcy risk because it might lead toward bankruptcy 
in the future (Altman & Saunders, 1997; D'Aveni & Ilinitch, 1992; Miller & Reuer, 
1996). This section suggests that attempts to create information asymmetry through 
corporate reporting manipulation may be influenced by default risk. This is because the 
greater the default risk, the greater is (i) the fear that reporting bad news may dissatisfy 
the firm’s creditors, (ii) the corresponding fear of loss in reputation among various other 
stakeholders, and (iii) the corresponding fear of loss in personal wealth.  
First, top executives in firms with higher default risk may attempt to create 
information asymmetry because they have greater fear that reporting bad news may 
dissatisfy capital market stakeholders and push the firm closer toward bankruptcy. 
Higher default risk invites greater scrutiny and loan monitoring from loss-averse 
creditors and heightens the fear of reporting bad news in top executives (Laverty, 1996: 
833-834). Top executives fear reporting bad news because creditors have considerable 
leeway in deciding whether to continue supporting top executives, and a firm’s 
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“bankruptcy occurs when creditors withdraw their support from a firm's top management 
team” (D'Aveni, 1990: 121). Given that negative information is cognitively weighed 
much more strongly than equivalent positive information (Kahneman, 2003), if top 
executives in firms with higher default risk report negative information, then it will 
become more difficult to procure support from the dissatisfied creditors and can push the 
firm even closer toward bankruptcy (D'Aveni, 1990). Hence, top executives might fear 
reporting bad news because they need to ensure continued support from creditors to 
avoid pushing the firm closer toward bankruptcy.  
Second, top executives in firms with higher default risk are more likely to create 
information asymmetry because they have a greater fear of loss in reputation. For 
example, the literature notes that default risk is a “gloomy and depressing” scenario 
(Tabb, 1995: 5) and can be a major “discrediting label” or “stigma” on the reputation of 
top executives (Sutton & Callahan, 1987: 405).  The risk of future bankruptcy causes 
“key organizational audiences to have negative reactions towards a firm” such as 
“denigrating an organization and its leaders,” and increases “the probability of 
organizational death and threatens managerial careers” (Sutton & Callahan, 1987: 405). 
Top executives greatly fear such loss in reputation because it can malign their career and 
hurt their standing in the job market (Paetzold, Dipboye, & Elsbach, 2008; Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987). Various other stakeholders such as its suppliers, customers, and 
employees, may also react negatively. Its suppliers may begin to search for alternative 
buyers and may demand upfront or immediate payments. Its customers/buyers may 
become uncertain about the firm, may begin to search for alternative sources of supplies, 
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and begin to cut down on the amount they buy from the firm. Its high-performing 
employees may begin to search for alternative employment with firms that might be in 
competition with their current employer. These negative reactions to reporting of bad 
news can push a firm with high default risk further towards bankruptcy (Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987).  
Third, top executives in firms with higher default risk are more likely to create 
information asymmetry because they have greater fear of loss in personal wealth. 
Agency theory assumes that top executives are motivated by their self-serving greed for 
greater personal wealth, and that this greed can be positively directed toward improving 
firm performance by implementing incentive compensation systems that link their pay to 
firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen, 1986). For example, the literature suggests 
that top executives be given stock-based compensation because they will try to improve 
firm performance in order to personally benefit from a corresponding increase in stock 
price (Hambrick et al., 2005; Jensen, 1986). However, this assumption is less likely to 
hold in firms with higher default risk in the debt market. For example, it has been 
recently observed that stock based compensation systems seem to be an effective way of 
rewarding top executives for improving firm performance, but only “as long as a 
company is out of range of bankruptcy” (Jensen, 2003: 401).  
The issue to be considered here is that in firms with higher default risk in the 
debt market, the potential to increase stock price becomes more limited. This is because 
stock market investors know that the firm might face bankruptcy in the future and are 
hesitant to pay a higher price for the stock. In fact, they are more likely to sell the stock 
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out of fear that the firm might go bankrupt in the future. Because of this gloomy 
scenario, top executives are more worried about finding ways to avoid a decline in stock 
price, avoid getting closer to bankruptcy, and avoid a corresponding loss in their 
personal wealth (Laverty, 1996; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). 
That is, top executives are less likely to be gain seeking and more likely to be loss averse 
as the firm is pushed closer toward bankruptcy. Hence, in firms with higher default risk, 
top executives have greater fear that they may lose their existing personal wealth if they 
push the firm closer toward bankruptcy by reporting bad news, and this aversion to loss 
in personal wealth might tempt them to find ways to conceal the bad news. 
In sum, top executives in firms with higher default risk may have greater fear of 
reporting bad news. This is because bad news can dissatisfy capital market stakeholders 
and push the firm closer toward bankruptcy, with corresponding losses in reputation and 
wealth. To avoid such scenarios, top executives in firms with higher default risk may 
become defensive about their strategic decisions (Powell, 1991). For example, top 
executives might escalate their commitment to their failed strategic decisions 
(Zardkoohi, 2004: 115), and they might do so by both deluding themselves (by assuming 
that all is okay) and hiding information from others, instead of accepting the mistakes 
(Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988: 16). In contrast, top executives in firms with lower default 
risk are less likely to fear the same because the firms are farther away from bankruptcy. 
Accordingly, it can be hypothesized that the greater the default risk, the greater the 
likelihood of attempts to create information asymmetry (through inconsistent reporting 
in the 1960s, and inaccurate reporting in the 1990s-2000s). 
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Hypothesis 3a. Default risk has a positive influence on attempts to create 
information asymmetry through inconsistent reporting (in the 1960s). 
Hypothesis 3b. Default risk has a positive influence on attempts to create 
information asymmetry through inaccurate reporting (in the 1990s-2000s). 
Interactive Effect of Default Risk and Loss Aversion  
The previous section suggested that default risk in the debt market influences 
attempts to create information asymmetry. An argument was that top executives fear 
reporting bad news because they worry about loss in personal wealth if the bad news 
pushes the firm closer toward bankruptcy. However, the extent of aversion to loss in 
personal wealth can vary, depending upon how much wealth the top executive stands to 
lose if the firm gets closer toward bankruptcy (Bateman, Kahneman, Munro, Starmer, & 
Sugden, 2005; Schmidt & Traub, 2002). That is, the strength of the association between 
default risk and attempts by top executives to create information asymmetry might be 
contingent upon the extent to which their personal wealth is exposed to loss if their firm 
approaches bankruptcy.  
In this regard, there are two points to be noted. First, a testable hypothesis can be 
suggested only for the 1990s-2000s because compensation data that is needed to 
empirically operationalize a top executive’s personal wealth is not available for the 
1960s. Second, as discussed earlier, recent research had made considerable progress by 
showing that stock options influenced inaccurate reporting in the 1990s-2000s (Burns & 
Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; O'Connor et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2008). This section 
extends this recent research by suggesting that the strength of the hypothesized 
 37
association between default risk and attempts to create information asymmetry is 
positively moderated by the extent to which top executives are exposed to loss in the 
value of their stock options.  
Stock options have been a substantial component of executive compensation 
since the mid 1980s (Coffee, 2005; Hall, 2000, 2003; Zardkoohi & Paetzold, 2004). If 
top executives report bad news that pushes the firm closer toward future bankruptcy, the 
portion of their personal wealth that is in the form of executive stock options can lose 
value (Betker, 1995: 171-172; Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993). An executive’s stock 
options “represent a share of the firm’s future wealth” (Blasi, Kruse, & Bernstein, 2003: 
xvii). Unlike salaries and bonuses that are based on past performance, stock options are a 
type of equity based compensation that are designed to motivate top executives to 
increase the future value of the firm’s stock (Hall, 2000; Zardkoohi & Paetzold, 2004). 
Executives prefer stock options to be ‘in-the-money’, that is, the market price exceeds 
the grant price, because top executives will gain financially if they can exercise any 
vested in-the-money stock options and sell the stock (Efendi et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 
2008). In contrast, during the time that stock options are ‘out-of-the-money’ (meaning 
that the market price is below the grant price), the stock options are essentially worthless 
(Efendi et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2008). As noted earlier, in firms with higher default 
risk, the potential to increase stock price becomes more limited because stock market 
investors know that the firm might face bankruptcy in the future. Accordingly, top 
executives mostly worry about finding ways to prevent a decline in the current value of 
their existing in-the-money stock options. That is, they become “loss averse when 
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subjectively valuing their options” (Devers, Wiseman, & Holmes, 2007: 203). Hence, 
when top executives have in-the-money stock options, greater default risk can heighten 
their fear of losing the in-the-money stock options, and this fear can tempt top executives 
to conceal negative information.  
As illustrated in Figure 3, the strength of the association between default risk and 
attempts to create information asymmetry through inaccurate reporting in the 1990s-
2000s is positively moderated by the extent to which in-the-money stock options 
constitute top executive compensation.3 When the ratio of in-the-money options to salary 
for a top executive is high (that is, executive’s aversion to loss in personal wealth is 
high), the association between default risk and attempts to create information asymmetry 
will be strongest. This is because top executives of firms with higher default risk might 
lose their in-the-money stock options if disclosure of negative information pushes their 
firms closer to bankruptcy. However, when the ratio of in-the-money options to salary 
for top executives is low (that is, executive’s aversion to loss in personal wealth is low), 
the association between default risk and attempts to create information asymmetry would 
weaken because the top executives will not lose as much.  
Hypothesis 4. The extent of top executive’s in-the-money stock options to salary 
ratio (as an indicator of aversion to loss in personal wealth) moderates the 
association between default risk and inaccurate reporting in the 1990-2000s, 
                                                 
3 Though in-the-money stock options is an appropriate indicator of loss aversion in the context of default 
risk related hypotheses, it was not necessarily so in the context of firm-specific risk related hypotheses in 
previous sections. This is because the volatility of stock price due to firm-specific risk sometimes make 
top executives gain seeking rather than loss averse (Devers, Wiseman, & Holmes, 2007). Hence, 
moderator variable of loss aversion was operationalized using institutional ownership concentration for the 
firm-specific risk related hypotheses, and moderator variable of loss aversion is operationalized using in-
the-money stock options to salary ratio for default risk related hypotheses.  
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such that the association is more positive when top executive’s in-the-money 
stock options to salary ratio is higher than when it is lower. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS 
 
Sample and Procedure 
Data from numerous sources are merged to create two unique longitudinal databases.  
The 1964-1969 sample. Compustat Quarterly is the primary source of data to 
identify firms that reported inconsistently4. For further verification, data on 
inconsistency of quarterly reporting is hand-collected from the index of Moody’s 
Industrial News Reports (similar to Butler et al., 2007) and then compared and collated 
with quarterly reporting of income/sales data from the Compustat-Quarterly dataset. 
These two data sources are used to verify which of the two classifications applies to each 
firm: (i) firm is consistently reporting quarterly in all years throughout the chosen 
period, versus (ii) firm is inconsistent in following quarterly reporting norm during the 
chosen period. For data collection and verification, the starting year is 1964 and the 
ending year is 1972. This is because (i) the Compustat-Quarterly database starts in 1962, 
but has considerably fewer firms and many missing values before 1964, and (ii) there is 
                                                 
4 Compustat Industrial Quarterly’s SAS database uses “.S” and “.A” as special missing codes/markers to 
indicate data items that are not reported quarterly (see page 686 of SAS ETS 9.1 User's Guide (4 Volume 
Set). 2004. SAS Institute: Cary, NC.). “.S” values imply semi-annual reporting. “.S” appears in 1st and 3rd 
quarters of the year to indicate that data in the 2nd and 4th quarters represents semi-annual figures rather 
than quarterly figures. “.A” values imply annual reporting. “.A” appears in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd quarters 
of the year to indicate that data in the 4th quarter represents an annual figure rather than quarterly figures. 
The special missing codes '.S' and '.A' are used in the Compustat Industrial Quarterly’s SAS dataset only. 
These special missing codes are a bit different in non-SAS datasets (see page 1 of chapter 2 and pages 1-2 
of chapter 5 in the Compustat Technical Guide. 2003. McGraw-Hill: Centennial, CO.). Such data codes 
change over time. For example, in Compustat Xpressfeed on WRDS, for semiannually or annually (instead 
of quarterly) reported data, a corresponding Data Code variable (variable name with _DC appended) 
contains a code of either 2 (semiannual) or 3 (annual) (see FAQs on Compustat Xpressfeed North America 
in WRDS). 
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no need to go beyond 1972 because data for the three-year period of 1970-72 is 
sufficient to verify that the sampled firms reported quarterly on a consistent basis after 
the 1970 SEC regulation. As discussed earlier (and illustrated in Figure 2), it is during 
the 1964-1969 period that quarterly reporting had become a widely prevalent norm, and 
despite this, certain firms were going against the norm. Hence, the six-year period of 
1964-1969 period is chosen for hypothesis testing. 
The 1997-2006 sample. As discussed earlier, the GAO has identified restatement 
announcement events during the period 1997 to 2006 (USGAO, 2002-2007), which is 
the sampling period for restatement announcements events for this study. Restatement 
data are not collected for years before 1997 because the literature suggests that 
institutional regulations might not have been strong enough to monitor and detect 
inaccurate statements and their restatements during earlier decades (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Karpoff et al., 2008). For example, studies that have tried collecting restatement data for 
1970s/1980s in the US have reported a very low number of restatement announcements 
per year (less than 0.5% of publicly listed firms) (Karpoff et al., 2008). Hence, the 1997-
2006 period dictated by the GAO datasets is appropriate for restatements data.  
Matched sampling. For both the 1964-69 focal group (that engaged in 
inconsistent reporting) and the 1997-2006 focal group (that engaged in inaccurate 
reporting), respective control groups are created by an exact match in year, 4-digit SIC 
industry code, and stock exchange, and then a closest match in total assets. The matched 
sampling steps are as follows. First, a pool of potential control firms is created by 
including all publicly listed firms, but removing firms that are included in the focal 
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group (that engaged in inconsistent/inaccurate reporting). Second, a one-to-many match 
is found between each focal firm and a set of potential control firms based on an exact 
match for the year, 4-digit SIC industry code, and stock exchange. Third, it is narrowed 
down to a one-to-one match between each focal firm and a control firm (from the set of 
potential control firms) by selecting a control firm whose total asset size is closest to that 
of the focal firm. Once a control firm is selected as a match for a particular focal firm, 
the control firm is removed from the pool of firms available for matching with the 
remaining focal firms. This ensures that the same control firm is not matched with any 
other focal firm. 5 This method is consistent with matched sampling procedures that have 
been widely used in the literature on corporate reporting manipulation (Arthaud Day et 
al., 2006; Butler et al., 2007; Efendi et al., 2007).  
Measures  
Attempts to create information asymmetry through corporate reporting 
manipulation. Measurement proxies in the two time-periods are as follows. 
(i) 1964-69: The first proxy for attempts to create information asymmetry is 
inconsistency in following the quarterly reporting norm during 1960s. There are two 
ways this inconsistency can be measured. First, it can be measured as a binary variable: 
inconsistent versus consistent reporting. This essentially measures the probability of 
inaccurate reporting in a logistic regression. A value of 1 is given to the focal group of 
firms that did not follow the consistent quarterly reporting norm during the 1964-69 
period (both income statements and balance sheets were not reported during certain 
                                                 
5 SAS code demos for such matching are available on WRDS forums. 
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quarters). A value of 0 is given to the control group of firms that strictly followed the 
consistent quarterly reporting norm throughout the 1964-69 period (by reporting both 
income statements and balance sheets every quarter). For both the focal and control 
groups, firms that were delisted or newly listed during the 1964-72 period are excluded 
to ensure a stable set of firms and prevent any entry/exit/survival bias (Butler et al., 
2007). Logistic regression will be the appropriate analytical tool when this binary 
measure is the dependent variable, and the independent variables would be firm-year 
observations with the data classified into the two groups.  
Second, the severity of reporting inconsitency can be measured by capturing the 
variance from quarterly reporting during the 1964-69 period. This is calculated using the 
variance formula (Σi (Xi - 3)2)/N, where Xi is the average time-gap in months between 
reports and (Xi – 3) is the deviation from quarterly time-gap (3 months) in the ith year 
across i = 1 to N years (with N = 6 years in this study). If a firm avoids reporting in 
certain quarters, then the average time-gap Xi will be greater than 3 months, and there 
will be a positive variance over the 1964-69 period. However, if a firm reports every 
quarter consistently, there will be zero variance. Equivalent data for matched consistent 
reporting firms (having zero variance) are included as controls. For severity of reporting 
inconsistency as the dependent variable, Tobin regression will be the appropriate 
analytical tool because the measure is left censored at 0.  
(ii) 1997-2006: The second proxy for attempts to create information asymmetry 
is restatement announcement events in 1990s-2000s that are a result of inaccurate 
reporting. Unlike the earlier period, this would follow an event study methodology. The 
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year of restatement announcement for a firm will be the event under consideration, and 
the independent variables lag behind the restatement event by 1-year. As per recent 
research on restatements, inaccurate reporting can be measured as a binary variable: 
inaccurate versus accurate reporting (Arthaud Day et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2008). A 
value of 1 is given to the focal group of firms associated with restatement announcement 
events, that is, an event announcing the need to restate inaccurate reports. A value of 0 is 
given to the matched control group of firms that are not associated with any restatement 
announcements. Logistic regression will be the appropriate analytical tool when this 
binary measure is the dependent variable.  
Second, the severity of reporting inaccuracy is measured using stock market 
correction/reaction upon restatement events. As expected, this correction is almost 
always negative (that is, the stock prices fall) and is proportional to the severity of 
reporting inaccuracy (Efendi et al., 2007; Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2004). 
Accordingly, severity of inaccuracy is measured by reverse scaling the cumulative 
market-adjusted abnormal returns during the (-1,0,1) days surrounding the restatement 
event. Equivalent data for the matched (non-restating/accurate reporting) firms are 
included as controls. OLS regression will be the appropriate analytical tool when this 
market correction measure of severity is the dependent variable. 
Firm-specific risk. Firm-specific risk (also known as business risk or 
unsystematic risk or residual risk) captures the portion of variability in a stock’s return 
that can be attributed to firm-specific actions and context (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). In 
contrast, market risk (also known as systematic risk or beta) captures the portion of 
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variability in a stock’s return that can be attributed to market-wide forces (Helfat & 
Teece, 1987). As discussed earlier, this study focuses on firm-specific risk. This is 
measured as the value of the residual (root mean square of error) in the capital asset 
pricing model’s (CAPM’s) equation for all firm-years using the CRSP dataset and 
Eventus software. In addition, some researchers suggest that top executives might be 
concerned about total risk (combination both firm-specific risk and market risk) rather 
than just the firm-specific risk (Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990; Bansal & Clelland, 2004; 
Helfat & Teece, 1987). Accordingly, for validity purposes, an alternative second 
measure used in this study is the firm’s total risk (measured as total variance in stock 
market returns). 
Default risk. Default risk is measured as the reverse scale of the Altman’s Z 
score (Altman, 1968; Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008). Further, in line with Jensen’s (1986: 
326) arguments about the need of “cash for debt service,” default risk is additionally 
measured as the debt-to-cash ratio (Deakin, 1972; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 1997). This is calculated as the ratio of a firm’s current debt liabilities 
(defined as the total short-term debt and the current portion of long-term debt that is due 
in one year) to cash held by the firm (defined as cash and all securities readily 
transferable to cash as listed in the current asset section). Data for calculating these 
measures are obtained from Compustat dataset. 
Institutional ownership concentration. One measure of institutional ownership 
concentration is the log transformation of the Herfindahl measure, that is loge Σi (Si2), 
where Si is the percentage of the firm’s equity owned by the ith institutional owner across 
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i = 1 to n institutional owners, where each owns at least 0.2 percent of a firm (Baysinger 
et al., 1991: 208). This measure incorporates the number of institutional stockholders 
and differentially weighs the sizes of their holdings by giving large institutional owners 
more weight than smaller owners (Baysinger et al., 1991: 208). A second measure of 
institutional ownership concentration is the average percentage of ownership per 
institutional owner (Baysinger & Butler, 1985: 185), that is (Σi Si)/n , where the 
numerator (Σi Si) is the total percentage of a firm’s equity held by all ‘n’ institutional 
owners. This measure is log transformed to loge((Σi Si)/n) to account for its skewed 
distribution. 
Data for calculating both the ‘Herfindahl’ measure and the ‘average’ measure of 
institutional ownership concentration are available in Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum 
Institutional (13f) Holdings dataset, but only after 1980. The only source of institutional 
ownership data that goes back to the 1960s is printed copies of the S&P Security 
Owner’s Stock Guide. This source contains only minimal aggregated data on (i) total 
percentage of a firm’s ownership held by all institutional owners, and (ii) total number of 
institutional owners. Therefore, hand-collected data from this source allows calculation 
of only the ‘average’ measure of institutional ownership concentration (but is not 
sufficient to calculate the ‘Herfindahl’ measure). In sum, the ‘Herfindahl’ measure of 
institutional ownership concentration can be calculated for only the 1997-2006 period 
only, and the ‘average’ measure of institutional ownership concentration can be 
calculated for both 1964-1969 and 1997-2006 periods.  
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Top executive in-the-money stock options to salary ratio. This ratio is adopted 
from Efendi et al. (2007: 688). The numerator ‘in-the-money stock options’ is measured 
as the total estimated dollar value of the CEO’s unexercised (vested and unvested) in-
the-money options; the denominator is the CEO’s base salary. As the default risk 
increases, the stock price might drop and the in-the-money stock options may go out of 
the money, but the base salary will usually hold constant. Hence, this ratio captures the 
extent to which a CEO is exposed to loss in personal wealth if reporting of bad news 
pushes the firm closer toward bankruptcy. Because stock options were non-existent 
during the 1960s, this ratio is measured only for 1997-2006 using the data from the 
Execcomp database (Efendi et al., 2007).  
Control variables. Control variables are chosen based on the suggestions of past 
research on restatements (Arthaud Day et al., 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 
2008). First, Compustat data for the 1960s and 1990s-2000s are used to calculate 
financial measures. Firm’s total assets is used as a control variable because the matched 
sampling procedures rely on the closest possible match of total assets (because an exact 
match is rare). Firm performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), and is used as a 
control variable because research suggests that restating firms usually suffered from poor 
firm performance (Arthaud Day et al., 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2008). 
Overvaluation is measured as market-to-book ratio (also known as simple Tobin’s Q), 
and is used as a control variable because research suggests that firms may manipulate 
reports in order to convince investors of growth prospects (Butler et al., 2007; Efendi et 
al., 2007; Graham et al., 2008). Second, recent studies have indicated the necessity to 
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control for variables related to CEO compensation structure, the data for which are 
available in Compustat-Execcomp (Efendi et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2008). However, 
CEO compensation data are not available for the 1960s, and hence two compensation-
related control variables (CEO’s base salary, and CEO bonus to salary ratio) are 
included only for the 1990s-2000s. Finally, a Sarbanes Oxley dummy variable is used 
for the 1990s-2000s model to control for the Sarbanes Oxley act that became effective 
on 30-July-2002. It has a value of 0 for restatement firms and corresponding control 
firms with a restatement event date before 30-July-2002, and a value of 1 for restatement 
firms and corresponding control firms with a restatement event date after 30-July-2002.  
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
Data Analysis Procedures 
Sample size and descriptive statistics. Given that data had to be collected and 
merged from numerous sources, the final usable sample size for the 1964-1969 period is 
396 firm-years (33 inconsistent reporting firms plus 33 matched control firms, over the 6 
year period), and the final usable sample size for the 1997-2006 period is 628 firm-
restatement-years (314 restatement events plus 314 matched controls). The means, 
standard deviations, and correlations for the variables are provided in Table 1. 
Longitudinal difference in risk between focal and control groups. For 
illustrative purposes, Figure 4 shows the longitudinal difference ‘∆ risk’ between the 
focal group of firms (that attempt to create information asymmetry) and the matched 
control group of firms. The annual ∆ risk values are positive. Throughout the 1964-69 
period, the average risk of the focal group of firms that attempted ‘inconsistent 
reporting’ was higher than the average risk of the control group of matched firms that 
were consistent in quarterly reporting. In the 1997-2006 period, the average risk of the 
focal group of firms during the 4 years prior to their respective restatement events was 
higher than the average risk of the control group of matched firms that reported 
accurately.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: (a) 1964-1969 values in italics with grey background in upper half, and (b) 1997-2006 values in lower half 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9a) (9b) (10a) (10b) (11a) (11b) (12)
Dependent Variables                
1) Info. Asymmetry versus Symmetry 
• 1964-1969: Inconsistent versus Consistent Reporting 
• 1997-2006: Inaccurate versus Accurate Reporting 
– 0.72* 0.07 -0.21* -0.14* – – – 0.23* 0.23* 0.24* 0.24* – -0.14* – 
2) Severity of Info. Asymmetry 
• 1964-1969: Severity of Reporting Inconsistency 
• 1997-2006: Severity of Reporting Inaccuracy: reverse scaled 
market correction % on restatement (R1) 
0.21* – 0.17* -0.14* -0.20* – – – 0.14* 0.15* 0.24* 0.07 – -0.11* – 
Independent Variables (Controls, Predictors, Moderators))                
3) Firm Size: Total Assets (in Millions of US Dollars) 0.02 -0.06 – 0.07 -0.17* – – – -0.61* -0.48* 0.25* -0.04 – -0.14* – 
4) Firm Performance: RoA -0.06 -0.13* 0.13* – 0.49* – – – -0.30* -0.28* -0.46* -0.30* – 0.05 – 
5) Overvaluation: Market-to-Book Ratio -0.04 -0.00 -0.71* -0.08* – – – – 0.02 -0.05 -0.24* -0.23* – 0.05 – 
6) CEO Salary (in 100,000s of US Dollars) -0.02 -0.10* 0.65* 0.17* -0.46* – – – – – – – – – – 
7) CEO Bonus to Salary Ratio -0.03 -0.04 0.42* 0.20* -0.47* 0.29* – – – – – – – – – 
8) Sarbanes Oxley  0.00 -0.14* 0.08* 0.03 -0.05 0.09* 0.05 – – – – – – – – 
9a) Firm-Specific Risk: CAPM residual (in 0.01 of units) 0.11* 0.25* -0.40* -0.41* 0.18* -0.31* -0.18* -0.43* – 0.95* 0.07 0.28* – -0.04 – 
9b) Firm’s Total Risk: Market Returns Variance (in 0.001 of 
units) 0.10* 0.26* -0.30* -0.44* 0.10* -0.26* -0.12* -0.35* 0.95* – 0.12* 0.28* – -0.09 – 
10a) Default Risk: reverse scaled Altman Z (R2) 0.06 0.10* 0.16* -0.67* -0.06 -0.09* -0.10* 0.02 0.22* 0.27* – 0.22* – -0.19* – 
10b) Default Risk: Debt-to-Cash Ratio 0.04 -0.01 0.32* 0.03 -0.13* 0.16* 0.02 -0.03 -0.21* -0.17* 0.11* – – 0.03 – 
11a) Institutional Own Conc (IOC): Herfindahl Measure -0.03 -0.04 -0.31* 0.08* 0.28* -0.08* -0.11* 0.19* -0.02 -0.07 -0.20* -0.16* – – – 
11b) Institutional Own Conc (IOC): Average Measure -0.02 0.01 -0.79* -0.08 0.68* -0.55* -0.38* 0.00 0.20* 0.10* -0.09* -0.16* 0.59* – – 
12) In-the-Money Options to Salary Ratio (in 10s of units) 0.08* 0.12* 0.11* 0.07 -0.21* -0.02 0.15* -0.15* 0.15* 0.20* -0.01 -0.13* -0.10* -0.28* – 
0.50 5.87 6.17 0.06 5.61 – – – 2.17 0.70 2.94 1.76 – 0.26 – Mean 
0.50 1.83 7.51 0.02 2.06 6.12 0.94 0.65 2.57 1.07 3.42 0.66 5.25 3.51 2.27
0.50 8.19 1.54 0.04 3.85 – – – 1.36 1.12 1.19 3.46 – 0.34 – Std. Dev. 0.50 7.75 1.67 0.13 1.57 2.82 1.09 0.48 1.48 1.33 1.42 0.66 0.79 0.68 5.49
0.00 0.00 3.15 -0.13 0.38 – – – 0.53 0.03 0.00 0.00 – 0.00 – Min 0.00 -15.24 4.45 -0.66 0.87 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.97 1.33 0.00
1.00 24.30 9.34 0.16 20.63 – – – 10.02 10.07 4.77 16.63 – 1.70 – Max 1.00 41.61 12.54 0.21 10.71 14.72 6.63 1.00 7.73 7.07 8.49 6.49 8.71 5.26 37.6
* p ≤ 0.05 ; For 1997-2006 period, sample size N = 628 firm-restatement-years (314 restatement events plus 314 matched controls); For 1964-1969 period, sample size N = 396 firm-years 
(33 inconsistent reporting firms plus 33 matched controls, over the 6 year period). Dollar values adjusted for inflation. Independent variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. 
(R1) Reverse scaled value of Market Correction % = (0.00 – original value) , (R1) Reverse scaled value of Alt Z = (maximum value – original value)  
Firm-Specific Risk variable was rescaled by multiplying by 100, Total Risk variable was rescaled by multiplying by 1000, and Options/Salary Ratio variable was rescaled by dividing by 10. 
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Figure 4. Longitudinal difference in risk between focal and control groups 
 
 
Regression tables. Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide the regression results. The units of 
independent variables were centered (mean = 0) because it avoids multicollinearity 
issues in interactions. Some variables were rescaled because the original units of 
variables were vastly different in magnitude. Centering and rescaling does not change 
the significance levels or directions of regression coefficients. The values of variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) in the hierarchical regression analyses were well below the rule-
of-thumb cut-off of 10, which suggest that there is no evidence of any multicollinearity 
1964-1969 1997-2006 
∆ Risk = (Risk of Inaccurate Reporting Group 
– Risk of Accurate Reporting Group) before 
restatement  
∆ Risk = (Risk of Inconsistent Reporting 
Group – Risk of Consistent Reporting 
Group), 6-year period 
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problems. When logistic regression is used, odds ratios (eβ) are provided instead of 
coefficients (β) for easier interpretation of the logistic regression results6. 
Table 2 provides the regression results for attempts to create information 
asymmetry through inconsistent reporting during 1964-69. Steps A1 through A7 in 
Table 2 are logistic regressions with probability of inconsistent reporting as the DV. 
Steps B1 through B7 in Table 2 are Tobin regressions with severity of reporting 
inconsistency as the DV (Tobin regression is used instead of OLS regression because 
this DV is inherently left-censored at 0).  
Tables 3 and 4 provide the regression results for attempts to create information 
asymmetry through inaccurate reporting (indicated by restatement events) during 1997-
2006. Steps A1 through A7 in Table 3 are logistic regressions with probability of 
inaccurate reporting as the DV. Steps B1 through B7 in Table 2 and steps C1 through C7 
in Table 3 are OLS regressions with severity of reporting inaccuracy as the DV. While  
the steps B1 through B7 in Table 3 use only half the sample (inaccurate reporting firms 
only), the steps C1 through C7 in Table 4 use the full sample (which makes it necessary 
to introduce a dummy variable for inaccurate reporting firms, with three-way 
interactions involving this dummy variable to test hypothesis 2b and hypothesis 4).  
 
 
                                                 
6 Odds ratio is the change in likelihood of the dependent variable for a one unit (one standard deviation) 
change in the independent variable. Odds ratio of lesser than one indicates a negative influence. 
 53
Table 2. Inconsistent reporting, 1964-69: Logistic regressions and Tobin regressions 
          
 Inconsistent versus Consistent Reporting, 1964-1969 
1 = Firms Do Not Consistently Report Quarterly  
0 =  Matched Control Firms Consistently Report Quarterly 
 
Logistic Regressions: Odds Ratios eβ 
 Severity of Reporting Inconsistency, 1964-1969 
 
Variance from Quarterly Reporting 
 
Tobin Regression: Unstandardized Parameter Estimates β 
Controls Primary Measures Alternative Measures Controls Primary Measures Alternative Measures  
Steps: A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 
Intercept 0.99 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.13 1.17 1.13 -0.18 -0.08 -0.08 -0.19 -0.56 -0.46 -0.56 
Controls               
         Firm Size: Total Assets 1.12** 1.58** 1.55** 1.60** 1.42** 1.36** 1.43** 1.23** 2.77** 2.70** 2.74** 0.15* 1.35* 1.35* 
         Firm Performance: RoA 0.00 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04 -56.04 15.10 14.91 14.64 -26.10 -24.94 -25.60 
         Overvaluation: Market-to-Book Ratio 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 -0.45† -0.56* -0.56* -0.53* -0.45† -0.46† -0.45† 
Primary Measures for Hypotheses               
H1a: Firm-Specific Risk: CAPM residual   2.45** 2.42** 2.20**     3.80** 3.72** 2.98**    
H3a: Default Risk: reverse scaled Altman Z  1.20† 1.18 1.20†     2.19** 2.10** 2.19**    
         Inst. Own Conc. (IOC) Average   0.58 0.75      -2.01 -0.91    
H2a: Firm Specific Risk  * IOC Average.    0.28**       -4.27    
Alternative Measures for Hypotheses               
H1a: Firm’s Total Risk: market ret. variance     5.02** 4.64** 4.21**     3.08** 2.82** 2.28† 
H3a: Default Risk: Debt-to-Cash Ratio     1.13** 1.15** 1.14**     0.13 0.16 0.16 
         Inst. Own Conc. (IOC) Average      0.52† 0.48†      -3.49 -3.46 
H2a: Firm Total Risk  * IOC Average       0.09**       -2.65 
Model Evaluation: Likelihood Ratio. χ2 22.1** 68.6** 71.2** 79.8** 67.5** 70.9** 78.7** 50.5** 95.8** 96.6** 98.9** 416.6** 418.6** 418.9**
Accuracy of Prediction (%Concordant) 63.1% 72.6% 73.1% 74.0% 73.0% 74.0% 74.7%        
Pseudo (Nagelkerke rescaled) R-square 0.07 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.29        
               
† p ≤ 0.10,   * p ≤ 0.05,  ** p ≤ 0.01 (conservative two-tailed) .  
Logistic Regressions: Odd ratios eβ less than 1.00 indicate a negative influence. Statistical significance of individual coefficients obtained using LR tests.  
Tobin Regression  is used because the continuous dependent variable ‘Variance from Quarterly Reporting’ is left censored at 0.   
All Regressions: Independent variables were centered (mean = 0). Firm-Specific Risk variable is in 0.01 units, it was rescaled by multiplying by 100. Total Risk variable is in 0.001 units, it 
was rescaled by multiplying by 1000. Dollar values adjusted for inflation. Independent variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles.  
For 1964-1969 period, Sample Size N = 396 firm-years (33 inconsistent reporting firms plus 33 matched controls, over 6 years).  
Maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.51, which is lower than the cut off 10.0, and implies that multicollinearity is not a problem
53 
 54
 Table 3. Inaccurate reporting, 1997-2006: Logistic regressions (full sample) and OLS regressions (for inaccurate firms only) 
 Inaccurate versus Accurate Reporting, 1997-2006 
1 = Event Announcing Need to Restate Inaccurate Reports 
0 = Non-Restating Matched Control Firm for Event  
 
Logistic Regressions: Odds Ratios eβ 
 Severity of Reporting Inaccuracy, 1997-2006 
% drop in share price (reverse scaled market reaction) on  
restatement event (inaccurate reporting firms only)  
 
OLS Regression: Unstandardized Parameter Estimates β 
Controls Primary Measures Alternative Measures  Controls Primary Measures Alternative Measures  
Steps: A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7  B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 
Intercept 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.11 1.06 1.06 1.22*  3.20** 3.07** 3.06** 3.11** 3.07** 3.06** 3.14**
Controls (Year dummies included)                
         Firm Size: Total Assets 1.15* 1.26** 1.21* 1.27* 1.16* 1.16 1.18  0.57 0.88† 1.28* 1.30* 0.66 1.67* 1.78*
         Firm Performance: RoA 0.39 0.88 0.82 1.24 0.95 0.84 0.86  -14.69** -9.00 -9.69 -10.38† -7.89† -8.73† -8.28†
         Overvaluation: Market-to-Book  1.03 0.99 0.93 0.94 1.00 0.95 0.99  1.36** 1.16** 1.30** 1.52** 1.15** 1.53** 1.74**
         CEO Salary 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.95  -0.39 -0.40 -0.51† -0.49† -0.37 -0.40 -0.42 
         CEO Bonus to Salary Ratio 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.86† 0.90 0.90 0.87  -0.23 -0.26 -0.30 -0.28 -0.21 -0.19 -0.11 
         Sarbanes Oxley  1.02 1.36 1.32 1.33 1.21 1.20 1.28  -2.90* -1.43 -1.98 -1.74 -1.43 -1.53 -1.25 
Primary Measures for Hypotheses                
H1b: Firm-Specific Risk: CAPM residual   1.30** 1.27** 1.28**      1.28** 1.34** 1.39**    
H3b: Default Risk: reverse scaled Alt Z  0.96 0.96 1.02      0.00 0.00 0.11    
         Inst. Own Conc. (IOC) Herfindahl   1.02 1.02       0.19 1.23    
         In-the-Money Options/Salary Ratio   1.04† 1.04       -0.06 -0.16    
H2b: Firm Specific Risk * IOC Herfindahl    0.79**        -0.36    
H4:  Default Risk Alt Z *Options/Salary    1.05*        0.78**    
Alternative Measures for Hypotheses                
H1b: Firm’s Total Risk: market variance     1.24* 1.22* 1.28*      1.54** 1.68** 1.73**
H3b: Default Risk: Debt-to-Cash Ratio     1.14 1.14 1.50*      0.87 0.74 1.07 
         Inst. Own Conc. (IOC) Average      1.12 1.15       2.52† 3.00*
         In-the-Money Options/Salary Ratio      1.04† 1.11*       -0.06 -0.10 
H2b: Firm Total Risk *IOC Average       0.78*        1.08*
H4:  Def. Risk Debt/Cash * Options/Sal       1.19**        0.33 
Model Evaluation: Likelihood Ratio. χ2 7.1 17.5* 20.5* 39.0** 14.1† 17.3† 31.5** R2: 0.14** 0.17** 0.17** 0.20** 0.18** 0.18** 0.20**
Accuracy of Prediction (%Concordant) 55.3 58.8 58.9 62.7 57.6 57.9 61.0 ∆ R2:  0.03* 0.00 0.03** 0.04** 0.00 0.02†
Pseudo (Nagelkerke rescaled) R-square 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.07         
† p ≤ 0.10,   * p ≤ 0.05,  ** p ≤ 0.01 (conservative two-tailed) .  
Logistic Regressions: Odd ratios eβ less than 1.00 indicate a negative influence. Statistical significance of individual coefficients obtained using LR tests. 
All Regressions: Independent variables were centered (mean = 0). Firm-Specific Risk variable is in 0.01 units, it was rescaled by multiplying by 100. Total Risk variable is in 0.001 units, it 
was rescaled by multiplying by 1000. Options/Salary Ratio variable is in 10s of units, it was rescaled by dividing by 10. Dollar values adjusted for inflation. Independent variables 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. Max VIF = 2.86 
For logistic regression, sample size N = 628 firm-restatement-years (314 restatement events plus 314 matched controls). For OLS regression, sample size = 314 restatement events.  
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Table 4. Inaccurate reporting, 1997-2006: OLS regressions (for market reaction. full sample of inaccurate and accurate reporting firms) 
Severity of Reporting Inaccuracy, 1997-2006 
% drop in share price (reverse scaled market reaction) during  
restatement event (for both inaccurate reporting firms and matched accurate reporting firms) 
 
OLS Regression: Unstandardized Parameter Estimates β 
Primary Measures C1 C2 C3 C4 Alternative Measures C1 C5 C6 C7 
Intercept 0.24 0.37 0.30 0.17 Intercept 0.24 0.37 0.26 0.10 
Controls (Year dummies included)     Controls (Year dummies included)     
         Inaccurate Reporting Dummy  
         (1=Inaccurate, 0=Accurate) 3.04** 2.83** 2.77** 2.92** 
         Inaccurate Reporting Dummy  
         (1=Inaccurate, 0=Accurate) 3.04** 2.82** 2.84** 3.03**
         Firm Size: Total Assets 0.29 0.50 0.42 0.44          Firm Size: Total Assets 0.29 0.34 0.73† 0.76* 
         Firm Performance: RoA -7.87** -3.92 -4.23 -4.24          Firm Performance: RoA -7.87** -3.33 -4.05 -3.82 
         Overvaluation: Market-to-Book  0.89** 0.76** 0.82** 0.85**          Overvaluation: Market-to-Book  0.89** 0.76** 0.98** 1.01**
         CEO Salary -0.25† -0.25† -0.19 -0.20          CEO Salary -0.25† -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 
         CEO Bonus to Salary Ratio -0.09 -0.12 -0.24 -0.22          CEO Bonus to Salary Ratio -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 
         Sarbanes Oxley  -1.22† -0.33 -0.47 -0.50          Sarbanes Oxley  -1.22† -0.33 -0.36 -0.31 
Predictors     Predictors     
H1b: Firm-Specific Risk: CAPM residual   0.82** -0.32 -0.35 H1b: Firm’s Total Risk: market variance  1.04** -0.46 -0.60 
H3b: Default Risk: reverse scaled Alt Z  0.04 -0.16 -0.26 H3b: Default Risk: Debt-to-Cash Ratio  0.65 0.11 0.02 
Moderators and Two-way Interactions     Moderators and Two-way Interactions     
         Inst. Own Conc. (IOC) Herfindahl   -0.06 -0.04          Inst. Own Conc. (IOC) Herfindahl   1.09 1.34 
         In-the-Money Options Salary Ratio   -0.09 -0.12          In-the-Money Options Salary Ratio   -0.11 -0.12 
        Firm Specific Risk * IOC Herfindahl   -0.15 -0.08         Firm Specific Risk * IOC Herfindahl   -0.69* -0.04 
        Default Risk Alt Z *Options/Salary   0.51** 0.24**         Default Risk Alt Z *Options/Salary   0.23 0.09 
        Firm Specific Risk * Inacc. Rep. Dummy   1.98** 2.02†         Firm Specific Risk * Inacc. Rep. Dummy   2.53** 2.68**
        Default Risk Alt Z * Inacc. Rep. Dummy   0.67 0.79         Default Risk Alt Z * Inacc. Rep. Dummy   1.08 1.27 
        IOC Herfindahl * Inacc. Rep. Dummy   0.61 0.63         IOC Herfindahl * Inacc. Rep. Dummy   0.37 0.25 
       Options/Salary * Inacc. Rep. Dummy   0.47 0.48        Options/Salary * Inacc. Rep. Dummy   0.59† 0.59† 
Three-way Interactions     Three-way Interactions     
H2b: Firm Specific Risk * IOC Herfindahl  
         * Inaccurate Reporting Dummy    -0.20 
H2b: Firm Total Risk *IOC Average  
         * Inaccurate Reporting Dummy    -0.96 
H4:  Default Risk Alt Z *Options/Salary  
        * Inaccurate Reporting Dummy    0.49† 
H4:  Def. Risk Debt/Cash * Options/Sal  
         * Inaccurate Reporting Dummy    0.25 
R2: 0.10** 0.12** 0.18** 0.19** R2: 0.10** 0.13** 0.18** 0.19**
∆ R2:  0.02* 0.06** 0.01 ∆ R2:  0.03** 0.05** 0.01 
† p ≤ 0.10,   * p ≤ 0.05,  ** p ≤ 0.01 (conservative two-tailed) .  
Logistic Regressions: Odd ratios eβ less than 1.00 indicate a negative influence. Statistical significance of individual coefficients obtained using LR tests. 
All Regressions: Independent variables were centered (mean = 0). Firm-Specific Risk variable is in 0.01 units, it was rescaled by multiplying by 100. Total Risk variable is in 0.001 units, it 
was rescaled by multiplying by 1000. Options/Salary Ratio variable is in 10s of units, it was rescaled by dividing by 10. Dollar values adjusted for inflation. Independent variables 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. For 1997-2006 OLS regression, sample size N = 628 firm-restatement-years (314 restatement events plus 314 matched controls).
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Interpreting disordinal (crossover) interactions. In coming sections, interaction 
plots will be provided for statistically significant interactions. Most of the interactions 
are found to be disordinal interactions because the lines in the plot actually cross within 
the range of the data. Note that “the more specific term crossover interaction is 
sometimes applied interactions with effects in opposite directions”  (Cohen, 2003: 286). 
Nonetheless, all disordinal interactions (including crossover interactions) have a 
crossing point, that is the “value of the predictor at which the simple regression lines 
cross” (Cohen, 2003: 288).  
Let us assume that M positively moderates the positive association between 
predictor X and dependent variable Y. That is, the coefficients of the main effect and 
interaction effect are all positive. Let us further assume that on plotting the interaction, 
we find that it is disordinal with a crossing point of X = C. The disordinal interaction can 
then be interpreted as follows: At values of X > C, any value of X will be associated 
with higher value of Y when Z is higher rather than lower; however at values of X < C, 
any value of X will be associated with higher value of Y when Z is lower rather than 
higher. 
Main effect: Influence of Firm-Specific Risk  
Hypothesis 1a (influence of firm-specific risk, 1964-69 period). Hypothesis 1a 
suggested that firm-specific risk has a positive influence on attempts to create 
information asymmetry through inconsistent reporting (in the 1960s). Logistic regression 
is carried out with the binary dependent variable of inconsistent versus consistent 
reporting. The probability of inconsistent reporting is positively and significantly 
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influenced by both measures of firm-specific risk: the primary measure of firm’s 
unsystematic risk using CAPM residual (eβ = 2.45, p<0.01 in step A2 of Table 2), and 
the alternative total risk measure (eβ = 5.02, p<0.01 in step A5 of Table 2). The results 
for the corresponding Tobin regression with dependent variable of severity of reporting 
inconsistency lead to similar conclusions for the main effects. The main effects of the 
firm-specific risk (CAPM residual measure (β = 3.80, p<0.01 in step B2 of Table 2) and 
firms’s total risk (β = 3.08, p<0.01 in step B5 of Table 2)) in the stock market are 
significant. 
Hence, results suggest that hypothesis 1a is supported for both probability of 
inconsistent reporting as the dependent variable (DV) and severity of reporting 
inconsistency as the DV.  
Hypothesis 1b (influence of firm-specific risk, 1997-2006 period). Hypothesis 
1b suggested that firm-specific risk has a positive influence attempts to create 
information asymmetry through inaccurate reporting (in the 1990s-2000s). Logistic 
regression is carried out with the binary dependent variable of inaccurate versus accurate 
reporting. The probability of inaccurate reporting is positively influenced by both 
measures of firm-specific risk: the primary measure of firm’s unsystematic risk using 
CAPM residual (eβ = 1.30, p<0.01 in step A2 of Table 3), and the alternative total risk 
measure (eβ = 1.24, p<0.05 in step A5 of Table 3). The results in the corresponding OLS 
regressions with the dependent variable of severity of reporting inaccuracy lead to 
similarly supportive conclusions. The main effect for CAPM residual measure of firm-
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specific unsystematic risk is significant (β = 1.28 with p<0.01 in step B2 of Table 3, and 
β = 0.82 with p<0.01 in step C2 of Table 4).  
Hence, results suggest that Hypothesis 1b is supported for both probability of 
inconsistent reporting as the dependent variable (DV) and severity of reporting 
inconsistency as the DV. 
Interaction: Influence of Firm-Specific Risk Moderated by Institutional Ownership 
Concentration  
Hypothesis 2a (influence of firm-specific risk moderated by institutional 
ownership concentration, 1964-69 period). Hypothesis 2a suggested that the extent of 
institutional ownership concentration (as an indicator of resistance to loss aversion) 
moderates the association between firm-specific risk and inconsistent reporting in the 
1960s, such that the association is more positive when institutional ownership 
concentration is lower than when it is higher.  
It was noted earlier that the probability of inconsistent reporting is positively and 
significantly influenced by measures of firm-specific risk in the stock market (in steps 
A2 and A5 of Table 2). The average measure of institutional ownership concentration 
negatively and significantly moderates these main effects (eβ = 0.28 with p<0.01 in step 
A4 of Table 2, and eβ = 0.09 with p<0.01 in step A7 of Table 2, respectively).  
The interactions plots are illustrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The interactions 
are disordinal. Figure 5 suggests a crossing point of firm-specific risk (CAPM residual) 
= 1.95e-02 units. Most of the firms in the sample seem to be having a value of firm-
specific risk > 1.95e-02 units. In firms with firm-specific risk > 1.95e-02 units, firm-
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specific risk will be associated with a higher probability of inconsistent reporting when 
institutional ownership concentration is lower rather than higher (that is, when loss 
aversion is higher rather than lower). However, in firms with firm-specific risk (CAPM 
residual) < 1.95e-02 units, firm-specific risk will be associated with a higher probability 
of inconsistent reporting when institutional ownership concentration is higher rather than 
lower (that is, when loss aversion is lower rather than higher). Figure 6 can be similarly 
interpreted.  
Results for the corresponding Tobin regression with dependent variable of 
severity of reporting inconsistency does not lead to similar conclusions for the 
moderating effects. As noted earlier, the main effects of measures of firm-specific risk in 
stock market are significant (in steps B2 and B5 or Table 2). However, the moderator 
variable ‘average measure of institutional ownership concentration’ does not play a 
statistically significant role in these associations (β = -4.27 with p>0.10 in step B4 of 
Table 2, and β = -2.65 with p>0.10 in step B7 of Table 2, respectively).  
Hence, results suggest that for probability of inconsistent reporting as the DV, 
Hypothesis 2a finds support at firm-specific risk values that are greater than a certain 
crossover value. However, for severity of reporting inconsistency as the DV, this 
hypothesis is not supported.  
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Figure 5. Interaction plot for hypothesis 2a (logistic regression, primary measures): Institutional 
ownership concentration (average proxy) moderates the association between firm-specific risk 
(CAPM residual) and probability of inconsistent reporting during 1964-69 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Interaction plot for hypothesis 2a (logistic regression, alternative measures): Institutional 
ownership concentration (average proxy) moderates the association between firm’s total risk 
(market returns variance) and probability of inconsistent reporting during 1964-69 
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Hypothesis 2b (influence of firm-specific risk moderated by institutional 
ownership concentration, 1997-2006 period). Hypothesis 2b suggested that the extent 
of institutional ownership concentration (as an indicator of resistance to loss aversion) 
moderates the association between firm-specific risk and inaccurate reporting in the 
1990-2000s, such that the association is more positive when institutional ownership 
concentration is lower than when it is higher.   
It was noted earlier that both measures of firm-specific risk have significant and 
positive main effects on the probability of inaccurate reporting (in steps A2 and A5 of 
Table 3). Both measures of resistance to loss aversion (that is, the Herfindahl measure of 
institutional ownership concentration (eβ = 0.79, p<0.01 in step A4 of Table 3) and 
average measure of institutional ownership concentration (eβ = 0.78, p<0.05 in step A7 
of Table 3)) show a significantly negative moderation of these main effects.  
The interactions plots are illustrated in Figure 7 and Figure 8. The interactions 
are disordinal. Figure 7 suggests a crossing point of firm-specific risk (CAPM residual) 
= 2.65e-02 units. Most of the firms in the sample seem to be having a value of firm-
specific risk (CAPM residual) > 2.65e-02 units. In firms with firm-specific risk > 2.65e-
02 units, firm-specific risk will be associated with a higher probability of inaccurate 
reporting when institutional ownership concentration is lower rather than higher (that is, 
when loss aversion is higher rather than lower). However, in firm’s with firm-specific 
risk < 2.65e-02 units, firm-specific risk will be associated with a higher probability of 
inaccurate reporting when institutional ownership concentration is higher rather than 
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lower (that is, when loss aversion is lower rather than higher). Figure 8 can be similarly 
interpreted.  
 
 
Figure 7. Interaction plot for hypothesis 2b (logistic regression, primary measures): Institutional 
ownership concentration (herfindahl proxy) moderates the association between firm-specific risk 
(CAPM residual) and probability of inaccurate reporting during 1997-2006 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Interaction plot for hypothesis 2b (logistic regression, alternative measures): Institutional 
ownership concentration (average proxy) moderates the association between firm’s total risk 
(market returns variance) and probability of inaccurate reporting during 1997-2006 
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For severity of reporting inaccuracy as the DV, the main effects of measures of 
firm-specific risk were significant (steps B2 and B5 of Table 3, and steps C2 and C5 of 
Table 4). However, the interactions with institutional ownership concentration give 
mixed results: non-significant in three cases (β = -0.36 with p>0.10 in step B4 of Table 
3, β = -0.20 with p>0.10 in step C4 of Table 4, and β = -0.96 and p>0.10 in step C7 of 
Table 4), but significant in one case (β = 1.08 and p<0.05 in step B7 of Table 3, versus). 
This significant interaction is plotted in Figure 9. It is disordinal with a crossing point of 
firm’s total risk (market returns variance) = 3.96e-03 units. In firms with total risk 
(market returns variance) > 2.65e-02 units, a firm’s total risk will be associated with a 
higher probability of inaccurate reporting when institutional ownership concentration is 
lower rather than higher (that is, when loss aversion is higher rather than lower). 
However, in firms with total risk (market returns variance) < 3.96e-03 units, a firm’s 
total risk will be associated with a higher probability of inaccurate reporting when 
institutional ownership concentration is higher rather than lower (that is, when loss 
aversion is lower rather than higher).  
Hence, results suggest that for probability of inaccurate reporting as the DV, 
Hypothesis 2b finds support at firm-specific risk values that are that are greater than a 
certain crossover value. However, for severity of reporting inaccuracy as the DV, this 
hypothesis finds mixed support (supported only for certain proxies of firm specific risk 
and IOC, at firm-specific risk values that are greater than a certain crossover value). 
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Figure 9. Interaction plot for hypothesis 2b (OLS regression, alternative measures): Institutional 
ownership concentration (average proxy) moderates the association between firm’s total risk 
(market returns variance) and severity of reporting inaccuracy during 1997-2006 
 
 
Main effect: Influence of Default Risk  
Hypothesis 3a (influence of default risk, 1964-69 period). Hypothesis 3a 
suggested that default risk has a positive influence on attempts to create information 
asymmetry through inconsistent reporting (in the 1960s). Though default risk measured 
as debt-to-cash ratio does not have a significant influence (β = 0.13, p>0.10 in step B5 of 
Table 2) on severity of reporting inconsistency in the Tobin regression, all other 
equivalent effects show significance. For instance, default risk measured as debt-to-cash 
ratio has a significantly positive influence on probability of inconsistent reporting in the 
logistic regression (eβ = 1.13, p<0.01 in step A5 of Table 2). Further, default risk 
measured as the reverse scale of Altman Z score has a significantly positive influence on 
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both the probability of inconsistent reporting logistic regression (eβ = 1.20, p<0.10 in 
step A2 of Table 2) and the severity of reporting inconsistency in the Tobin regression (β 
= 2.19, p<0.05 in step B2 of Table 2).  
In sum, results suggest that Hypothesis 3a is supported for probability of 
inconsistent reporting as the DV. However, for severity of reporting inconsistency as the 
DV, this hypothesis finds mixed support (that is, supported only for certain proxies of 
default risk). Overall, there is reasonable support for the argument of Hypothesis 3a, 
which states that default risk has a positive influence on attempts to create information 
asymmetry through inconsistent reporting. Perhaps, this influence would be even 
stronger in the presence of a loss aversion moderator, which is currently absent due to 
lack of relevant data for the 1960s  
Hypothesis 3b (influence of default risk, 1997-2006 period). Hypothesis 3b 
suggested that default risk has a positive influence on attempts to create information 
asymmetry through inaccurate reporting (in the 1990s-2000s). The default risk main 
effects are statistically non-significant in both logistic regressions (eβ = 0.96 with p>0.10 
in step A2 of Table 3, and eβ = 1.14 with p>0.10 in step A5 of Table 3) and OLS 
regressions (β = 0.00 with p>0.10 in step B2 of Table 3, β = 0.87 with p>0.10 in step B5 
of Table 3, β = 0.04 with p>0.10 in step C2 of Table 4, β = 0.65 with p>0.10 in step C5 
of Table 4). Hence, results suggest that Hypothesis 3b is neither supported for 
probability of inaccurate reporting as the DV, nor supported for severity of reporting 
inaccuracy as the DV.  
 
  
66
Interaction: Influence of Default Risk Moderated by In-the-Money Stock Options 
to Salary Ratio   
Hypothesis 4 (influence of default risk moderated by institutional ownership 
concentration, 1997-2006 period). Hypothesis 4 suggested that the extent of top 
executive’s in-the-money stock options to salary ratio (as an indicator of aversion to loss 
in personal wealth) moderates the association between default risk and inaccurate 
reporting in the 1990-2000s, such that the association is more positive when top 
executive’s in-the-money stock options to salary ratio is higher than when it is lower.  
As noted earlier, the default risk main effects are statistically non-significant in 
both logistic regressions (steps A2 and A5 of Table 3) and OLS regressions (steps B2 
and B5 of Table 3, and steps C2 and C5 of Table 4). However, for probability of 
inaccurate reporting as the DV, all the interactions between default risk and in-the-
money-options to salary ratio are statistically significant (eβ = 1.05, p<0.05 in step A4 of 
Table 3, and eβ = 1.19, p<0.01 in step A7 of Table 3). The results are mixed for severity 
of reporting inaccuracy as the DV. Some of the interactions with in-the-money-options 
to salary ratio are statistically significant (β = 0.78 with p<0.01 in step B4 of Table 3, 
and β = 0.49, p<0.10 in step C4 of Table 4), and some others are statistically non-
significant (β = 0.33 with p>0.10 in step B7 of Table 3, and β = 0.25 with p>0. 10 in step 
C7 of Table 4).  
Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12 are interaction plots that illustrate the reason 
why the main effects of default risk are statistically non-significant but its interaction 
effects with in-the-money stock options to salary ratio are statistically significant. When 
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in-the-money-options to salary ratio is low, default risk tends to have a negative 
influence on both probability and severity of inaccurate reporting. However, when in-
the-money-options to salary ratio is high, default risk tends to have a statistically 
significant and positive influence on both probability and severity of inaccurate 
reporting. Hence, at moderate values of in-the-money-options to salary ratio, the effect 
of default risk tends to be weak. 
The interactions are also disordinal. Figure 10 suggests a crossing point of 
default risk (reverse scaled Altman Z) = 5.52. In firms with higher default risk (that is, 
Altman Z score < 5.52, because it is reverse scaled), a firm’s default risk will be 
associated with a higher probability of inaccurate reporting when in-the-money stock 
options to salary ratio (that is, loss aversion) is higher rather than lower. In firms with 
lower default risk (that is, Altman Z score > 5.52), a firm’s default risk will be associated 
with a higher probability of inaccurate reporting when in-the-money stock options to 
salary ratio (that is, loss aversion) is lower rather than higher. Figure 10 can be similarly 
interpreted with severity of inaccurate reporting as the DV.  
Figure 11 can also be similarly interpreted. Figure 10 suggests a crossing point of 
default risk (debt-to-cash ratio) = 0.45. In firms with higher default risk (that is, debt-to-
cash ratio > 0.45), a firm’s default risk will be associated with a higher probability of 
inaccurate reporting when in-the-money stock options to salary ratio (an indication of 
loss aversion) is higher rather than lower. In firms with lower default risk (that is, debt-
to-cash ratio < 0.45), a firm’s default risk will be associated with a higher probability of 
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inaccurate reporting when in-the-money stock options to salary ratio (an indication of 
loss aversion) is lower rather than higher. 
Hence, results suggest that for probability of inaccurate reporting as the DV, 
Hypothesis 4 finds support at default risk values that are greater than a certain crossover 
value. However, this hypothesis finds mixed support for severity of reporting inaccuracy 
as the DV.  
 
 
Figure 10. Interaction plot for hypothesis 4 (logistic regression, primary measures): In-the-money 
stock options to salary ratio moderates the association between default risk (reverse scaled Altman Z 
score) and probability of inaccurate reporting during 1997-2006 
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Figure 11. Interaction plot for hypothesis 4 (OLS regression, primary measures): In-the-money 
stock options to salary ratio moderates the association between default risk (reverse scaled Altman Z 
score) and severity of reporting inaccuracy during 1997-2006 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Interaction plot for hypothesis 4 (logistic regression, alternative measures): In-the-money 
stock options to salary ratio moderates the association between default risk (debt to cash ratio) and 
probability of inaccurate reporting during 1997-2006 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
While it is well known that top executives in the 1990s-2000s attempted to create 
information asymmetry through inaccurate reporting, it is important to note that top 
executives in the 1960s also attempted to create information asymmetry by simply not 
following the consistent quarterly reporting norm. In general, the findings of this study 
support the key argument that a firm’s risk can turn counterproductive by creating a fear 
of reporting bad news to capital market stakeholders, especially when loss aversion is 
high. The coming sections discuss the findings, suggest theoretical implications, suggest 
implications for practice, and suggest other possible avenues for future research. 
Discussion of Findings  
Table 5 provides a summary of the hypotheses and results. Results from logistic 
regressions suggest that the hypothesized predictors (indicating firm’s risk) and 
moderators (indicating loss aversion) can significantly predict the probability of 
corporate reporting manipulation in both eras (that is, for predicting the probability of 
inconsistent reporting in the 1960s and inaccurate reporting in the 1990s-2000s). 
However, the results from Tobin/OLS regressions suggest that the hypothesized 
predictors and moderators are not as helpful in predicting the severity of corporate 
reporting manipulation.  
  
71
Table 5. Summary of hypotheses and results 
Support for hypothesis (at p < 0.05, two tailed) 
dependent variable (DV) = information asymmetry 
through corporate reporting manipulation # Hypothesis Statement 
DV = probability  
(Logistic regressions) 
DV = severity  
(Tobin/OLS regressions) 
 Main effect: Influence of firm-specific risk   
1a  Firm-specific risk has a positive influence on attempts to create information asymmetry through inconsistent reporting (in the 1960s). Supported Supported 
1b  Firm-specific risk has a positive influence attempts to create information asymmetry through inaccurate reporting (in the 1990s-2000s) Supported Supported 
 Interaction: Influence of firm-specific risk moderated by institutional ownership concentration  
2a  
The extent of institutional ownership concentration (as an indicator of resistance to 
loss aversion) moderates the association between firm-specific risk and inconsistent 
reporting in the 1960s, such that the association is more positive when institutional 
ownership concentration is lower than when it is higher.  
Supported for firm-
specific risk values that 
are greater than a certain 
crossover value 
Not supported 
2b 
The extent of institutional ownership concentration (as an indicator of resistance to 
loss aversion) moderates the association between firm-specific risk and inaccurate 
reporting in the 1990-2000s, such that the association is more positive when 
institutional ownership concentration is lower than when it is higher. 
Supported for firm-
specific risk values that 
are greater than a certain 
crossover value 
Mixed support (that is, it 
depends on which proxy 
measure is used), and only 
for firm-specific risk values 
that are greater than a 
certain crossover value 
 Main effect: Influence of default risk   
3a Default risk has a positive influence on attempts to create information asymmetry through inconsistent reporting (in the 1960s). Supported 
Mixed support (that is, it 
depends on which  proxy 
measure is used) 
3b Default risk has a positive influence on attempts to create information asymmetry through inaccurate reporting (in the 1990s-2000s). Not supported Not supported 
 Interaction: Influence of default risk moderated by in-the-money stock options to salary ratio  
4 
The extent of top executive’s in-the-money stock options to salary ratio (as an 
indicator of aversion to loss in personal wealth) moderates the association between 
default risk and inaccurate reporting in the 1990-2000s, such that the association is 
more positive when top executive’s in-the-money stock options to salary ratio is 
higher than when it is lower. 
Supported, for default risk 
values that are greater 
than a certain crossover 
value 
Mixed support (that is, it 
depends on which proxy 
measure is used), and only 
for firm-specific risk values 
that are greater than a 
certain crossover value 71 
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Influence of firm-specific risk, and moderation by institutional ownership 
concentration. In both the 1960s and 1990s-2000s, firm-specific risk in the stock market 
significantly influences both the probability and severity of corporate reporting 
manipulation. Further, the influence of firm-specific risk on probability of corporate 
reporting manipulation tends to be more positive when (i) institutional ownership 
concentration is low (that is, loss aversion is high), and (ii) the firm-specific risk value is 
higher than a certain critical (crossover) value. The crossover values in the interaction 
plots suggest that the interaction between higher firm-specific risk and lower 
institutional ownership concentration will lead to greater corporate reporting 
manipulation only after a critical value of firm-specific risk has been exceeded. 
For probability of corporate reporting manipulation as the DV (in logistic 
regressions), the moderating effect of institutional ownership concentration is always 
significant (for both 1960s and 1990s-2000s). However, for severity of corporate 
reporting manipulation as the DV (in Tobin/OLS regressions), the moderating effect of 
institutional ownership concentration is mixed (non-significant for the 1960s, and mixed 
results for the 1990s-2000s based on which measure is used).  
Hence, institutional ownership concentration plays an important moderating role 
in the influence of firm-specific risk on probability of corporate reporting manipulation, 
but plays a less important role in the influence of firm-specific risk on severity of 
corporate reporting manipulation. The severity seems to be primarily determined by the 
main effect of firm-specific risk. That is, while institutional ownership concentration 
plays a role in whether or not an executive in a firm (with high firm-specific risk) will 
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attempt to create information asymmetry through corporate reporting manipulation, it 
plays a lesser role the actually determining the severity with which the executive 
engages in corporate reporting manipulation.  
Influence of default risk, and moderation by in-the-money stock option to 
salary ratio. In the 1960s, default risk in the debt market had a direct effect on the 
probability of inaccurate reporting. However, the results for the influence of default risk 
on the severity of reporting inaccuracy are mixed (that is, it depends on the proxy used 
for measuring default risk). As per theoretical arguments presented in this paper, the 
influence of default risk could have been stronger in the presence of a loss aversion 
moderator. However, such an interaction test is not feasible for the 1960s due to the lack 
of compensation data needed to operationalize an executive’s aversion to loss in 
personal wealth as his/her firm approaches bankruptcy (as noted earlier, executive stock 
options were non existent in the 1960s).  
In the 1990s-2000s, default risk in the debt market did not have direct effects on 
the probability and severity of reporting inaccuracy. Importantly however, default risk 
interacts with the variable ‘in-the-money stock option to salary ratio’ (which is an 
indicator of personal wealth that is exposed to loss in firms approaching bankruptcy) to 
influence the probability of inaccurate reporting. The influence of default risk on 
probability of inaccurate reporting in the 1990s-2000s tends to be more positive when (i) 
in-the-money stock option to salary ratio is high (that is, loss aversion is high), and (ii) 
the default risk value is higher than a certain critical (crossover) value. The crossover 
values in the interaction plots suggest that default risk and in-the-money stock option to 
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salary ratio will have a positive interaction effect on inaccurate reporting only after a 
critical value of default risk has been exceeded. 
Though the moderating effect of in-the-money stock option to salary ratio is 
significant for probability of inaccurate reporting as the DV (in logistic regressions), the 
results are mixed for severity of corporate reporting manipulation as the DV (in OLS 
regression). Hence, in-the-money stock option to salary ratio plays an important 
moderating role in the influence of default risk on probability of inaccurate reporting, 
but plays a less important role in moderating the influence of default risk on severity of 
reporting inaccuracy.  
The theoretical implications of these findings are as follows.  
Theoretical Implications 
 The findings suggests that there are shortcomings in agency theory, and that there 
is a need to integrate agency theory with prospect theory.  
Shortcomings in agency theory. It is well known that early work on agency 
theory is based on the “relationship between the manager (i.e., agent) of the firm and the 
outside equity and debt holders (i.e., principals)” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 310). 
Agency theory arguments assume that top executives attempt to create information 
asymmetry because of their own opportunistic self-interest. The theory argues that 
mechanisms that can control and prevent any such divergent behavior should be adopted 
(Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). That is, there should be “efforts on the part of the 
principal to control the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation 
policies, operating rules etc.” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 308). Agency theory suggests 
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that by using such controlling mechanisms, principals should encourage greater firm-
specific risk for potentially greater returns on the stock market, and encourage higher 
debt as a way to ensure managerial efficiency (Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While the agency theory prescriptions are well established, 
this study suggests that such demands for greater firm-specific risk and higher debt 
might turn counterproductive by creating a fear of reporting bad news to capital market 
stakeholders.  
First, agency theory suggests that shareholders should demand greater firm-
specific risk for potentially greater returns on the stock market. For this, shareholders are 
encouraged to control top executives through “budget restrictions, and the establishment 
of incentive compensation systems” that will “serve to more closely identify the 
manager’s interests with those of the outside equity holders” and encourage executives 
to assume greater firm-specific risk for greater stock market returns (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976: 323). However, this can be counterproductive. Top executives complain that they 
fear reporting bad news because of the cognitive bias of myopic loss aversion in stock 
market investors (Haigh & List, 2005; Laverty, 1996; Thaler et al., 1997). That is, “when 
executives destroy the value they are supposed to be creating, they almost always claim 
that stock market pressure made them do it” (Rappaport, 2006: 66). Top executives 
blame shareholders, who in their quest for greater stock returns had adopted various 
means to push top executives to change from “caretakers into risk takers” but got highly 
dissatisfied when the risk yielded losses rather than gains  (Brownstein & Panner, 1992: 
35). Given a choice, top executives often prefer that their firms should become private 
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by delisting from stock exchanges and “point out just how important the absence of 
stock market pressures is for their ability to take a long-term perspective” (Mintzberg, 
1996: 76). Hence, when shareholders have high loss aversion, agency theory based 
recommendations that encourage greater firm-specific risk for greater returns might turn 
counterproductive by creating a fear of reporting bad news.   
Second, the agency theory arguments suggest that higher debt is a way to ensure 
greater managerial efficiency, because outside debt holders will demand regular and 
assured payments. The argument has been that the “threat caused by failure to make debt 
service payments serves as an effective motivating force to make such organizations 
more efficient” (Jensen, 1986: 324). However, the threat of bankruptcy from higher debt 
can turn counterproductive. Top executives metaphorically equate the looming “threat of 
bankruptcy” from higher debt to a mortal fear of being “hanged in a fortnight”  
(Augustine, 1997: 93). The higher the default risk, the greater the fear in top executives 
that reporting bad news will push the firm toward bankruptcy and result in loss of 
personal reputation and loss of personal wealth. That is, agency theory based 
recommendations that encourage greater debt for greater managerial efficiency might 
turn counterproductive by creating a fear of reporting bad news.   
In sum, a paradox is that while traditional agency theory suggested that capital 
market stakeholders (that is, principals - outside equity and debt holders) should enforce 
controlling mechanisms that align the interests of top executives with that of the capital 
market stakeholders, it is surprising that the same mechanisms are now being blamed for 
misalignments (Ghoshal, 2005). In recent times, even agency theorists have expressed 
  
77
concern that current budgeting and compensation systems are turning otherwise “honest 
managers into schemers,” who feel pressured to “conceal information,” “game the 
system,” and “manage the numbers to influence the perceptions” of various demanding 
stakeholders (Jensen, 2001: 95-97; 2003). In contrast to agency theory arguments, this 
study provides an alternative theoretical explanation for why top executives create 
information asymmetry. Attempts to create information asymmetry may be a 
manifestation of the fear of reporting bad news to capital market stakeholders, and not 
just a result of self-serving interest as suggested by the agency theory literature. Risk, by 
definition, implies that both positive and negative outcomes are possible. However, top 
executives fear reporting negative information because (as argued by prospect theory’s 
loss aversion axiom) they worry that the capital market stakeholders will give more 
weight to negative information and get easily dissatisfied. When cognitive bias of loss 
aversion is high, both firm-specific risk in the stock market and default risk in debt 
market can turn counterproductive by creating a fear of reporting bad news. This fear of 
reporting bad news to capital market stakeholders is manifested as attempts to create 
information asymmetry.  
The need to integrate agency theory and prospect theory. Do the results of this 
study change the theoretical prescriptions and notions or our understanding of agency 
theory? Yes, it does. Agency theory literature can be traced back to the work of Berle & 
Means (1932) on the separation of ownership and management. While such separation 
has its benefits, it can also lead to agency problems arising from the divergent and risk-
averse behavior of agents. As a solution, Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggested that 
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compensation systems of top executives (agents) should be linked to firm performance 
in order to avoid agency problems and encourage risk-taking. While this might be a good 
way to resolve agency problems, this study shows that the encouragement of risk-taking 
might have inadvertently contributed to a fear of reporting bad news (manifested in 
attempts to create information asymmetry through corporate reporting manipulation). 
Hence, there is an unintentional negative repercussion for what was originally a well-
intentioned recommendation by agency theorists.  
Do agency theory and prospect theory need to be integrated in order to truly 
understand executive behavior and to guide them to perform in the way we desire? The 
answer is yes. Future research needs to integrate agency theory and prospect theory. 
Agency theory was based on a rational assumption that people would love to gain as 
much as they would hate to lose. It assumed that the consequences of high risk-taking, 
that is either large gains or large losses, would balance out in the long term because of its 
underlying assumption that people would love to gain as much as they would hate to 
lose.  
However, prospect theory highlighted that at a subconscious level “losses loom 
larger than corresponding gains,” and that on average, the dissatisfaction from a loss is 
more than twice the satisfaction from an equivalent amount of gain (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991: 1039). As noted earlier, people on average need to be compensated a 
bit more than $200 to fully overcome a dissatisfaction of losing $100 because they “feel 
the $100 loss more than the $200 gain,” that is, “the disutility of losing $100 is roughly 
twice the utility of gaining $100” (Thaler et al., 1997: 648-649). This implies that even if 
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disclosed amounts of positive information and negative information are technically 
equal, top executives might be unfairly assessed as mediocre because stakeholders give 
approximately twice the weight to negative information and become easily dissatisfied 
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Kahneman, 2003).  
Hence, there is a need to integrate agency theory and prospect theory. 
Encouragement for risk-taking and the design of compensation systems should be based 
on a fundamental assumption that people hate to lose more than they love to gain. This is 
important because encouraging executive risk-taking and designing executive 
compensation systems without factoring in the strong distaste for losses in humans (in 
executives, capital market stakeholders, and possibly other types of stakeholders) can 
tempt the executives to create information asymmetry through corporate reporting 
manipulation. The coming section describes how this can be implemented in practice.  
Implications for Practice 
The theoretical implications suggested a need to integrate agency theory and 
prospect theory. A corresponding implication for strategic management practice is that 
the design of compensation systems should incorporate both agency theory and prospect 
theory. Further, there are implications for public policy. Apart from institutional 
regulations on the monitoring of excessive risk taking and fraudulent behavior, policy 
makers need to acknowledge that humans tend to have a strong distaste for losses and 
design institutional regulations accordingly. 
Designing compensation systems that integrate agency theory and prospect 
theory. Recent research has made considerable progress, finding that such attempts by 
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top executives to create information asymmetry through corporate reporting 
manipulation have been motivated by compensation incentive mechanisms such as stock 
options (Burns & Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; O'Connor et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 
2008). In contrast, the main focus of this study was on the direct effect of ‘risk’, and the 
moderation of this direct effect by loss aversion. This findings of this study highlights 
the need to design compensation systems that gives due consideration to both agency 
theory and prospect theory. Two solutions are suggested below. 
1) Reward More, Punish Less. One solution (that integrates agency theory and 
prospect theory) might be to give a greater degree of rewards to executives for improved 
firm performance, but give lesser degree of punishment for poor performance. For 
example, prospect theory suggests dissatisfaction from a loss is more than twice the 
satisfaction from an equivalent amount of gain. Hence, it might appropriate to design 
compensation systems where the punishment for a loss is less than half of the rewards 
for an equivalent amount of gain.   
2) Long term moving average. Another solution might be to pay executives based 
on the basis of a long-term ‘moving average’ of firm performance as opposed to short-
term firm performance. Lawler (1990: 22) gives the example of 3M (Minnesota Mining 
and Manufacturing) as “an organization that protects and rewards its risk-takers”. He 
explains their compensation system as follows.   
“…individuals are rewarded based on their long-term track record rather than on 
the immediate success or failure of their most recent venture. This approach, 
which has allowed 3M to retain many of its better managers in entrepreneurial 
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ventures and activities, is quite different from what all too happens in large 
corporations…” (Lawler, 1990: 22) 
On similar lines, top executives can be rewarded based on long-term performance rather 
than on the successes or failures of their most recent risky activity. This would 
encourage top executives to take up more risky activities, with lesser fear of losses.  
Institutional regulations. The US government has been taking many actions in 
response to the concerns highlighted in this study. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted 
in July 2002, in response to such corporate scandals. This has made it harder for firms to 
hide information through inaccurate reporting, and led to more cases of inaccurate 
reporting being revealed. Further, the current US administration is already moving in a 
direction that addresses some of the concerns highlighted in this study. President Obama 
has suggested various regulatory changes where “part of that has to do with the effects of 
regulation that will inhibit some of the massive leveraging and the massive risk-taking 
that had become so common” (Obama, 2009).    
These initiatives by the US government are important. Nonetheless, an issue that 
deserves a revisit by the policy makers is that of quarterly reporting. The 1970 SEC 
institutional regulation mandating consistent quarterly reporting ended the legal choice 
that US firms had for withholding information. This seems to have contributed to short-
termism, that is, a myopic view where firm strategies have become focused more on the 
short-term rather than the long-term (Laverty, 1996; Thaler et al., 1997). Earlier sections 
had described the theoretical arguments that favor greater flexibility toward allowing 
firms to extend the gap between reporting events. The literature notes that top executives 
  
82
might prefer a flexible legal option that allows them to temporarily withhold or delay the 
reporting of their quarterly financials (Alford et al., 1993; Bhojraj & Libby, 2005). This 
would be especially important when executives have private information that they do not 
want to disclose to the public at that particular point of time. Stock analysts and 
shareholders who like frequent and timely information may resist this suggestion, but 
they too might appreciate its benefits when faced with a choice between ‘timely but 
inaccurate’ versus ‘accurate but delayed’ reports. It gives executives the flexibility to 
stay honest, and not fall prey to the temptation of fudging the numbers. Metaphorically 
speaking, it offers a choice between the lesser of two evils. If executives have some 
flexibility on the timing of disclosure, it will reduce their temptation to release an 
inaccurate report, and will allow them to release a delayed but accurate report. \ 
Limitations 
 No study in our field is perfect, and this study has its share of limitations too. 
Some of the possible limitations are listed below.  
Coarse-grained proxies. A limitation of this study is that it does not capture the 
exact extent of psychological loss aversion in an executive. This is possible in 
experimental conditions, and most research on prospect theory has been done in 
experimental conditions. In contrast, this is not a experimental study and it uses firm-
level proxies derived from archival data. Correspondingly, a possible limitation is that 
the firm-level proxies are rather coarse-grained, that is, they might not fully capture the 
behavioral underpinnings of the arguments put forth in this study.  
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 Data availability. Another limitation is that of insufficient data for the 1960s. For 
example, compensation data is needed to empirically operationalize a top executive’s 
aversion to loss in personal wealth. However, compensation data is not available for the 
1960s (moreover, stock options were non-existent before 1973, and started becoming a 
substantial component of executive compensation only the mid 1980s). Further, due to a 
lack of sufficient data that goes back to the 1960s, the ‘Herfindahl’ measure of 
institutional ownership concentration could not be calculated for the 1964-69 period. 
The minimal data that is available from the 1964-69 period allowed the calculation of 
only the ‘average’ measure of institutional ownership concentration.  
Matched sampling and lack of independence. A key assumption of regression 
analysis is that of independence of observations, that is, data for variables is sampled 
randomly and that the observations are independent of each other. Independence means 
that the observations should not be correlated with or dependent on each other. The 
empirical method of matched sampling suffers from the limitation of a possible lack of 
independence (Austin, 2008; Cram, Karan, & Stuart, 2007; Hill, 2008; Rubin, 2006).  
This study’s matched sampling procedure is consistent with those that have been 
widely used in the literature on corporate reporting manipulation (Arthaud Day et al., 
2006; Butler et al., 2007; Cram et al., 2007; Efendi et al., 2007). The procedure involved 
selecting (or pairing) a distinct control firm that matches each focal firm exactly in year, 
4-digit SIC industry code, and stock exchange, and is the closest match in total assets.  
An advantage of this procedure is that the matched firms will be more similar to 
the focal firms than unmatched firms (in terms of the matching variables), thereby 
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providing the researcher with a set of comparable firms. The literature notes that 
“although a matched-pair sampling design has limitations, it is generally considered an 
appropriate way to study phenomena with a low base rate of occurrence” (Arthaud Day 
et al., 2006: 1125). A disadvantage is that matching induces dependence between the 
focal and matched control groups. There is a lack of independence because the 
observations in matched control group are dependent on the observations in the focal 
group. This might result in standard errors that are overly conservative (Hill, 2008).  
Other Avenues for Future Research 
 Earlier sections on the implications of this study suggested that future research 
should consider integrating agency theory and prospect theory and design compensation 
systems accordingly. This section discusses other potential avenues for future research: 
CEO turnover and succession, the current economic crisis, and the need to extend 
institutional theory.  
CEO turnover and succession. Recent research suggests that CEOs are more 
likely to be fired if it is found that the firm had disclosed inaccurate financial reports 
(Arthaud Day et al., 2006). An avenue for future research is to investigate the dynamics 
of risk-taking and loss-aversion when a CEO is fired due to corporate reporting 
manipulation and is replaced by a successor.  
The likelihood of a CEO being fired due to corporate reporting manipulation 
might be contingent upon the extent of loss aversion among its stakeholders. It seems 
that loss-averse stakeholders would be the most displeased with the negative news 
regarding inaccurate reporting, and would refuse to give the CEO any benefit of doubt. 
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Furthermore, some questions about CEO succession are relevant. Who is selected to 
succeed the fired CEO and why? Will the firm’s owners prefer the new CEO to be an 
insider or outsider? While an ‘untainted’ outsider might be preferred as CEO in order to 
send a positive signal to the market, it would be harder for the owners to attract an 
outsider to a firm whose reputation has already been stigmatized. Hence, a new CEO 
might demand a relatively much higher compensation for him/her to consider leading the 
stigmatized firm.  
The current economic crisis. The US economy and much of the world economy 
has entered into a sudden and severe crisis in late 2008 and 2009, and this offers another 
avenue for future research. Although the future will judge the severity of this crisis, 
some believe that the crisis may be the most severe since the great depression. Given the 
shocking speed with which this crisis arrived, it is not surprising that there is a lack of 
clarity about the origins and dynamics of this crisis, with numerous theories floating 
around in the media and among researchers. Nonetheless, there seem to be two sides to 
the coin when one analyzes the causes of this crisis.  
On the one hand, some firms were able to take on high debt in the past because 
of easy availability of credit and/or by hiding negative information about their own 
financial health from creditors. Such firms started defaulting on their debt payments 
when faced with a tough economy. It seems that there was a downward spiral, whereby 
firms (debtors) chose to continue hiding negative information about their financial health 
from the creditors in order to either obtain more credit or avoid being declared bankrupt 
(Graham et al., 2008).  
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On the other hand, some creditors (banks) took on high firm-specific risk by 
providing easy loans to customers who had insufficient resources to cover their debts. 
This firm-specific risk by creditors backfired when their debtors defaulted on their 
payments. Interestingly, it seems that the creditors kept this negative information about 
their toxic assets hidden for quite some time (before it blew out of proportion and 
resulted in the sudden crisis). Given the findings of this study, it would be interesting to 
check the extent to which and for how long the creditors kept this negative information 
hidden. Further, it is possible that executives of these creditor firms feared reporting bad 
news about toxic assets in order to either avoid displeasing shareholders or avoid a fall in 
personal wealth. 
In sum, this crisis seems to be the result of a rather peculiar scenario where both 
creditors and debtors took on high risk. That is, creditor firms (banks) took on high firm-
specific risk by providing easy loans, and debtors took on high default risk by accepting 
the easy loans. Further, both creditor firms and debtor firms seemed to have hidden 
negative information in order to keep their avoid displeasing each other. At some point 
in late 2008 the bubble burst, all the previously hidden negative news came pouring out 
from both sides, and the economy collapsed at shocking speed. Hence, the arguments 
offered in this study can help future researchers to theoretically and empirically analyze 
the crisis in coming years.  
Institutional theory, competitive advantage, and moral dilemma. Another 
avenue for future research is to extend institutional theory on the dynamics of conflict 
between institutional demands and a firm’s pursuit of competitive advantage, and the 
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associated moral dilemma. This would also offer an alternative explanation for many of 
the arguments presented in this study. It was discussed earlier that though quarterly 
reporting had become an institutional norm by the early 1960s, some listed firms resisted 
the norm and chose to not report quarterly, or at least not do so on a consistent basis. 
Because there was no mandatory regulation/law against this practice, these few firms 
made use of their legal right to hide information (by not following the consistent 
quarterly reporting norm) (Butler et al., 2007; Taylor, 1965). Despite the legality of these 
actions in the 1960s, the actions were not necessarily legitimate in terms of the 
prevailing social norm of consistent quarterly reporting. Informal legitimacy requires 
that actions be in conformance with institutionally constructed system of non-mandatory 
social norms (Suchman, 1995: 574). In contrast, legality (formal legitimacy) requires 
that actions be in conformance with the institutionally constructed system of mandatory 
laws (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009).  
An institution often demands that firms that come under its purview should 
conform to it, and the institutional demands can be in the form of either (non-mandatory) 
norms or (mandatory) laws. Sometimes these demands are in conflict with a firm’s 
strategic initiatives. A firm’s ability to differentiate itself from other firms might suffer if 
it conforms to the conflicting institutional demands. This is illustrated in Figure 13.  
If neither norms nor laws are created by an institution, then it gives firms the 
freedom to aggressively differentiate themselves (from other firms) in pursuit of 
competitive advantage. However, if there are institutional norms in place, then firms face 
pressure to forego any strategic initiatives that run counter to the norms. This leads to a 
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fair amount of moral dilemma - disobeying the norms might help in maintaining or 
improving competitive advantage, but it would be considered as socially illegitimate 
behavior (though it would be legal). Disobeying the laws will not hurt the firms legally, 
but it might expose the firms to a loss in informal legitimacy. The literature suggests that 
some firms do choose to pursue their competitive advantage by disregarding the social 
legitimacy aspect; for example, the inconsistency in following quarterly reporting norms 
by some firms in the 1960s, and the continued existence of firms in the tobacco industry 
in more modern times. 
Finally, if mandatory institutional laws are imposed, then firms face pressures to 
forego any strategic initiatives that might run counter to the laws. This leads to the 
greatest amount of moral dilemma - disobeying the laws might help in maintaining or 
improving competitive advantage, but it would be considered as illegal behavior. For a 
firm to overcome this moral dilemma in a positive manner, they would have to sacrifice 
the conflicting strategic initiatives in favor of obeying the laws. However, if a firm 
succumbs to this moral dilemma in a negative manner, then it might imply either one of 
the following. One possibility is that the firm has chosen to act illegally in an explicit 
manner (a rather extreme example would be illicit drug cartels). The other possibility is 
that the firm has chosen to hide its illegal behavior by putting on a fake show of 
conformance to institutional laws (example, inaccurate reporting by firms in the 1990s-
2000s, and various other cases of fraud in recent times). Either way, it is likely that those 
who choose such paths of immoral behavior will have to bear the consequences of 
disobeying the law.  
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Figure 13. Other avenues for future research: Institutional theory, competitive advantage, and 
moral dilemma 
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Conclusion 
Top executives fear that capital market stakeholders will cognitively weigh 
negative information more strongly than equivalent positive information, tempting them 
to avoid reporting negative information as a result. Top executives have attempted to 
create information asymmetry in the 1960s by not following the consistent quarterly 
reporting norm and in the 1990s-2000s through inaccurate reporting. This study suggests 
that both firm-specific risk (firm’s unsystematic risk as assessed by stock market) and 
default risk (difficulty faced by firm in meeting its debt market obligations) influenced 
attempts to create information asymmetry in both eras (1960s and 1990s-2000s). 
Moreover, the extent of loss aversion moderates the influence of risk: (i) institutional 
ownership concentration (as an indicator of shareholder resistance to loss aversion) 
negatively moderates the influence of firm-specific risk in both the 1960s and 1990s-
2000s, and (ii) CEO in-the-money stock options to salary ratio (as an indicator of 
personal wealth that is exposed to loss if firm approaches bankruptcy) positively 
moderates the influence of default risk in the 1990s-2000s. Overall, when loss aversion 
is high, a firm’s risk can turn counterproductive by creating a fear of reporting bad news 
to capital market stakeholders. 
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